Certain intelligence of the war between Great Britain and France reached Calcutta July 7th, 1778.  On the same day the Governor-General ordered immediate preparations to attack Pondicherry, the principal seaport of the French.  The army arrived before the place on the 8th of August, and on the same day Commodore Sir Edward Vernon anchored in the roads to blockade by sea.  A French squadron, under Captain Tronjoly, soon after appearing in the offing, Vernon gave chase, and on the 10th an action ensued.  The forces engaged were about equal, the French, if anything, slightly superior; a 60-gun ship and four smaller vessels being on each side.  As the French then went into Pondicherry, the immediate advantage may be conceded to them; but, Vernon returning on the 20th, Tronjoly soon after quitted the roads, and returned to the Ile de France.[136] From that day the British squadron blockaded closely, and on the 17th of October Pondicherry capitulated.

On the 7th of March, 1779, Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes sailed for the East Indies with a small squadron.  The French also sent out occasional ships; but in 1779 and 1780 these went no further than the Ile de France, their naval station in the Indian Ocean.  Hughes’s force remained unopposed during those years.  The period was critical, for the British were at war with Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore, and with the Mahrattas; and all depended upon command of the sea.  In January, 1781, when Hughes was wintering at Bombay, the French squadron under Comte d’Orves appeared off the Coromandel coast, but, despite Hyder Ali’s entreaties, it refused to cooeperate with him.  The different spirit of the two commanders may be illustrated from contemporary documents.

“We have advices from Fort St. George of a French squadron which appeared off that place on January 25, 26, and 27, consisting of 1 seventy-four, 4 sixty-fours, and 2 fifties.  They proceeded south without making any attempt on five Indiamen then in the roads, with a number of vessels laden with grain and provisions; the destroying of which might have been easily accomplished, and would have been severely felt.”

“On December 8th, off Mangalore,"[137] writes Hughes, “I saw two ships, a large snow, three ketches, and many smaller vessels at anchor in the road with Hyder’s flag flying; and, standing close, found them vessels of force and all armed for war.  I anchored as close as possible, sent in all armed boats, under cover of three smaller ships of war, which anchored in four fathoms water, close to the enemy’s ships.  In two hours took and burned the two ships, one of 28 and one of 26 guns, and took or destroyed all the others, save one which, by throwing everything overboard, escaped over the bar into the port.  Lost 1 lieutenant and 10 men killed, 2 lieutenants and 51 wounded.”

It is interesting to note these evidences of Hughes’s conceptions of naval warfare and enterprise, common though they were to the British service; for their positive character brings into strong relief the qualities of his next antagonist, Suffren, and his great superiority in these respects over the average run of French officers of that day.