British on a line inclined to that of the enemy, the van nearest, and as the signal was renewed three quarters of an hour later,—­at 3.17,—­this angle became still more marked (bb).[98] This was the original and enduring cause of a lamentable failure by which seven of the rear ships, in an inferior force undertaking to attack, never came into battle at all.  At 3.34 the van was ordered again to keep still more toward the enemy.

[Illustration]

At 3.46 the signal was made for ships to close to one cable, followed almost immediately by that to bear down and engage the enemy,—­the signal for the line still flying.  Graves’s flagship, the London, 98 (f), which was hove-to, filled and bore down.  Under the conditions, the van ships of course got first under fire, and the action gradually extended from them to the twelfth in the order, two ships astern of the London.  According to the log of the latter, at 4.11 the signal for the line ahead was hauled down, that it might not interfere with that for close action, but at 4.22 it was rehoisted, “the ships not being sufficiently extended.”  The meaning of this expression may be inferred from Beatson’s account:—­

“The London, by taking the lead, had advanced farther towards the enemy than some of the ships stationed immediately ahead of her in the line of battle; and upon luffing up (f’) to bring her broadside to bear, they having done the same thing, her second ahead (m) was brought nearly upon her weather beam.  The other ships ahead of her were likewise too much crowded together.”

As the ship on the London’s weather beam could not fire upon the enemy unless she drew ahead, this condition probably accounts for the flagship being again hove-to, while firing, as Hood says that she was.  The signal for the line was hauled down again at 4.27, by the London’s log, that for close action being up, and repeated at 5.20, when Hood (h) at last bore down with his division (h’), but the French ships bearing up also, he did not near them.  Firing ceased shortly after sunset.  The loss of the British was 90 killed, 246 wounded; that of the French is given only in round numbers, as about 200 killed and wounded.

Hood’s statement introduces certain important qualifications into the above account:—­

“Our centre began to engage at the same time as the van, at four, but at a most improper distance, and our rear, being barely within random shot, did not fire while the signal for the line was flying.  The London had the signal for close action flying, as well as the signal for the line ahead at half a cable was under her topsails, with the main topsail to the mast,[99] though the enemy’s ships were pushing on.”

As showing the improper distance at which the London brought-to to fire, he says:—­