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Arbuthnot accepted the position offered, stood on as he was until nearly abreast of the French, and at 2 P.M. made the signal to wear.  It does not appear certainly how this was executed; but from the expression in the official report, “the van of the squadron wore in the line,” and from the fact that the ships which led in the attack were those which were leading on the port tack,—­the tack before the signal was made,—­it seems likely that the movement was made in succession (a).  The whole squadron then stood down into action, but with the customary result.  The ships in the van and centre were all engaged by 2.30, so Arbuthnot states; but the brunt of the engagement had already fallen upon the three leading vessels, which got the first raking fire, and, as is also usual, came to closer action than those which followed them (C).  They therefore not only lost most heavily in men, but also were so damaged aloft as to be crippled.  The British Vice-Admiral, keeping the signal for the line flying, and not hoisting that for close action, appears to have caused a movement of indecision in the squadron,—­an evidence again of the hold which the line then still had upon men’s minds.  Of this des Touches cleverly availed himself, by ordering his van ships, which so far had borne the brunt, to keep away together and haul up on the other tack (e), while the ships behind them were to wear in succession; that is, in column, one following the other.  The French column then filed by the three disabled British vessels (d), gave them their broadsides one by one, and then hauled off to the eastward, quitting the field (D).  Arbuthnot made signal to wear in pursuit, but the Robust and Prudent, two of the van ships, were now wholly unmanageable from the concentration of fire upon them caused by des Touches’s last movement; and the maintopsail yard of the London, the only British three-decker, had been shot away.  The chase therefore was abandoned, and the squadron put into Chesapeake Bay, for which the wind was fair (D).  The French returned to Newport.  The respective losses in men were:  British, 30 killed, 73 wounded; French, 72 killed, 112 wounded.

In this encounter, both sides had eight ships in line, besides smaller craft.  The advantage in force was distinctly with the British, who had one three-decked ship, three 74’s, three 64’s, and a 50; while the French had one 84, two 74’s, four 64’s, and the late British Romulus, 44.  Because of this superiority, probably, the action was considered particularly discreditable by contemporaries; the more so because several vessels did not engage closely,—­a fault laid to the British admiral’s failure to make the signal for close action, hauling down that for the line.  This criticism is interesting, for it indicates how men’s minds were changing; and it shows also that Arbuthnot had not changed, but still lived in the middle of the century.  The French commodore displayed very considerable tactical skill; his squadron was handled neatly, quickly, and with precision.  With inferior force he carried off a decided advantage by sheer intelligence and good management.  Unluckily, he failed in resolution to pursue his advantage.  He probably could have controlled the Chesapeake had he persisted.