On the same day Arbuthnot also was writing to Clinton, from Gardiner’s Bay, that the French were evidently preparing to quit Newport.  His utmost diligence had failed as yet to repair entirely the damage done his squadron by the storm, but on the 9th it was ready for sea.  On the evening of the 8th the French had sailed.  On the 10th Arbuthnot knew it, and, having taken the precaution to move down to the entrance of the bay, he was able to follow at once.  On the 13th he spoke a vessel which had seen the enemy and gave him their course.  Favoured by a strong north-west wind, and his ships being coppered, he outstripped the French, only three of which had coppered bottoms.  At 6 A.M. of March 16th a British frigate reported that the enemy were astern—­to the north-east—­about a league distant, a thick haze preventing the squadron from seeing them even at that distance (A, A).  Cape Henry, the southern point of the entrance to the Chesapeake, then bore southwest by west, distant forty miles.  The wind as stated by Arbuthnot was west; by the French, south-west.

The British admiral at once went about, steering in the direction reported, and the opposing squadrons soon sighted one another.  The French finding the British between them and their port, hauled to the wind, which between 8 and 9 shifted to north by west, putting them to windward.  Some preliminary manoeuvres then followed, both parties seeking the weather-gage.  The weather remained thick and squally, often intercepting the view; and the wind continued to shift until towards noon, when it settled at north-east.  The better sailing, or the better seamanship, of the British had enabled them to gain so far upon their opponents that at 1 P.M. they were lying nearly up in their wake, on the port tack, overhauling them; both squadrons in line of battle, heading east-south-east, the French bearing from their pursuers east by south,—­one point on the weather bow (B, B).  The wind was rising with squalls, so that the ships lay over well to their canvas, and the sea was getting big.

As the enemy now was threatening his rear, and had the speed to overtake, des Touches felt it necessary to resort to the usual parry to such a thrust, by wearing his squadron and passing on the other tack.  This could be done either together, reversing the order of the ships, or in succession, preserving the natural order; depending much upon the distance of the enemy.  Having room enough, des Touches chose the latter, but, as fighting was inevitable, he decided also to utilise the manoeuvre by surrendering the weather-gage, and passing to leeward.  The advantage of this course was that, with the existing sea and wind, and the inclination of the ships, the party that had the opponent on his weather side could open the lower-deck ports and use those guns.  There was thus a great increase of battery power, for the lower guns were the heaviest.  Des Touches accordingly put his helm up, his line passing in succession to the southward (c) across the head of the advancing British column, and then hauling up so as to run parallel to the latter, to leeward, with the wind four points free.