Rodney’s imagination, as is shown in his letters, was greatly impressed by the magnitude of the prize and by the defenceless condition of his capture.  He alleged these as the motives for staying in person at St. Eustatius, to settle the complicated tangle of neutral and belligerent rights in the property involved, and to provide against the enemy’s again possessing himself of a place now so equipped for transactions harmful to Great Britain.  The storehouses and conveniences provided for the particular traffic, if not properly guarded, were like fortifications insufficiently garrisoned.  If they passed into the hands of the enemy, they became sources of injury.  The illicit trade could start again at once in full force, with means which elsewhere would have first to be created.  There were a mile and a half of storehouses in the lower town, he said, and these he must leave at the least roofless, if not wholly demolished.

For such reasons he remained at St. Eustatius throughout February, March, and April.  The amount of money involved, and the arbitrary methods pursued by him and by Vaughan, gave rise to much scandal, which was not diminished by the King’s relinquishing all the booty to the captors, nor by the latters’ professed disinterestedness.  Men thought they did protest too much.  Meanwhile, other matters arose to claim attention.  A week after the capture, a vessel arrived from the Bay of Biscay announcing that eight or ten French sail of the line, with a large convoy, had been seen on the 31st of December steering for the West Indies.  Rodney at once detached Sir Samuel Hood with eleven ships of the line, directing him to take also under his command the six left before Fort Royal, and to cruise with them to windward of Martinique, to intercept the force reported.  Hood sailed February 12th.  The particular intelligence proved afterwards to be false, but Hood was continued on his duty.  A month later he was ordered to move from the windward to the leeward side of the island, and to blockade Fort Royal closely.  Against this change he remonstrated, and the event showed him to be right; but Rodney insisted, saying that from his experience he knew that a fleet could remain off Fort Royal for months without dropping to leeward, and that there ships detached to Santa Lucia, for water and refreshments, could rejoin before an enemy’s fleet, discovered to windward, could come up.  Hood thought the Admiral’s object was merely to shelter his own doings at St. Eustatius; and he considered the blockade of Fort Royal to be futile, if no descent upon the island were intended.  “It would doubtless have been fortunate for the public,” he remarked afterwards, “had Sir George been with his fleet, as I am confident he would have been to windward instead of to leeward, when de Grasse made his approach.”