of the line of battle, resting upon men who did not stop to study facts or analyse impressions, and who had seen officers censured, cashiered, and shot, for errors of judgment or of action, naturally produced hesitations and misunderstandings.  An order of battle is a good thing, necessary to insure mutual support and to develop a plan.  The error of the century, not then exploded, was to observe it in the letter rather than in the spirit; to regard the order as an end rather than a means; and to seek in it not merely efficiency, which admits broad construction in positions, but preciseness, which is as narrowing as a brace of handcuffs.  Rodney himself, Tory though he was, found fault with the administration.  With all his severity and hauteur, he did not lose sight of justice, as is shown by a sentence in his letter to Carkett.  “Could I have imagined your conduct and inattention to signals had proceeded from anything but error in judgment, I had certainly superseded you, but God forbid I should do so for error in judgment only,”—­again an illusion, not obscure, to Byng’s fate.

In Barbados, Rodney received certain information that a Spanish squadron of twelve ships of the line, with a large convoy of ten thousand troops, had sailed from Cadiz on April 28th for the West Indies.  The vessel bringing the news had fallen in with them on the way.  Rodney spread a line of frigates “to windward, from Barbados to Barbuda,” to obtain timely warning, and with the fleet put to sea on the 7th of June, to cruise to the eastward of Martinique to intercept the enemy.  The latter had been discovered on the 5th by a frigate, fifty leagues east of the island, steering for it; but the Spanish admiral, seeing that he would be reported, changed his course, and passed north of Guadeloupe.  On the 9th he was joined in that neighbourhood by de Guichen, who was able to bring with him only fifteen sail,—­a fact which shows that he had suffered in the late brushes quite as severely as Rodney, who had with him seventeen of his twenty.

Having evaded the British, the allies anchored at Fort Royal; but the Spanish admiral absolutely refused to join in any undertaking against the enemy’s fleet or possessions.  Not only so, but he insisted on being accompanied to leeward.  The Spanish squadron was ravaged by an epidemic, due to unsanitary conditions of the ships and the uncleanliness of the crews, and the disease was communicated to their allies.  De Guichen had already orders to leave the Windward Islands when winter approached.  He decided now to anticipate that time, and on the 5th of July sailed from Fort Royal with the Spaniards.  Having accompanied the latter to the east end of Cuba, he went to Cap Francois, in Haiti, then a principal French station.  The Spaniards continued on to Havana.