This tendency to destruction, from encroachments of public bodies in established governments, is more to be dreaded in limited monarchies, and in democracies, than in pure monarchies; but we have had little occasion to observe the progress in governments of the former sort, excepting the clergy, though the military and the nobles generally play their part.

In Rome, the military never were dangerous, while the armies were only raised, like militias, for the purpose of a particular war; but, when they became a standing body, they were the proximate efficient cause of destroying liberty, though this was only the prelude to that decline which afterwards took place.

In limited monarchies, the lawyers are the greatest body, from which this sort of danger arises, and the reasons are numerous and evident.

United in interest, and constantly occupied in studying the law of the country, while the public at large are occupied on a variety of different objects, and without any bond of union, there can be nothing more natural than that they should contrive to render the business which they alone can understand, of as much importance and profit as possible.

In the criminal law of the country, where the king is the prosecutor, and where the lawyers are not interested in multiplying expense or embarrassment, our laws are administered with admirable attention; though, perhaps, in some cases, they are blamed for severity, they are justly admired over the world for their mode of administration.

It is very different in cases of property, or civil actions, where it is man against man, and where both solicitor and council =sic= are interested in the intricacy of the case.  Here, indeed, the public is so glaringly imposed upon, that it would be almost useless to dwell on the sub-[end of page #119] ject, and, as a part of the plan of this work is to offer, or point out, a remedy, it may be sufficient, in this case, to go over the business once, and leave the examples till the relief is proposed.

At present, it is, however, necessary to shew why, as things are constituted in mixed governments like this, no remedy is to be had.  The public only acts by representatives; and, in the House of Lords, the law-lords, who have l’esprit du corps, may easily contrive to manage every thing.  One or two noblemen excepted, no one either has, or pretends to have sufficient knowledge to argue or adjust a point of law.  Indeed, it is no easy matter to do so with effect, for, besides that, the law-lords have ministers on their side, or, which is the same thing, are on the side of ministers, the speaker is himself at the head of the law.  The other members who look up to the law-lords, and who are generally very few in number on a law-question, generally give their assent.  In the House of Commons, in which there are a number of lawyers, they are still less opposed.  The country gentlemen profess ignorance.  They think that to watch money-bills, the privileges of the house, the general interests of the nation, roads, canals, and inclosures, is their province.  The mercantile, and other interests, composed of men getting money with great rapidity, consider the abuses of law as not to them of much importance; they do not feel the inconvenience, and have neither time nor inclination to study the subject. {98}