No duty or service is exacted with less rigour than that belonging to a civil department under government, when it is not connected with accountability in money; none so rigorous where money is concerned.  How is this to be accounted for, unless it is by shewing that the nature of the situation admits of giving way to the feelings of humanity in one case, and not in the other?  A few examples will illustrate this point, which is very important, very well known, but not well understood.

A clerk in a public office wants, either for health or private business, or, perhaps, only for amusement, to absent himself from duty; if his conduct merits any indulgence, and if his request is any way reasonable, it is immediately granted, though his salary during his absence may amount to a considerable sum; but he receives the gift under the form of time, not of money.  If the same clerk is in arrear for taxes to one-twentieth part of the amount, if he does not pay, his furniture will be seized, and that perhaps by order of the same superior from whom he obtained the leave of absence from his duty. {89}

The consequences would be fatal if the case were reversed.  Supposing that leave of absence had been refused, and that a remission of taxes had been granted, the man who remitted the tax would be liable to suspicion, which he could never do away; the receipt of the revenue would never be secure, and the clerk, who had demanded a fair indulgence, would be disgusted and provoked at the refusal.

We cannot, however, alter the nature of things.  Taxes cannot be remitted, in any case, without discretional authority, and that it would

—–­ {89} Accountability in money may be compared to military discipline, when on duty.  No allowances are to be made for negligence or deviation from rule.  Of this we have lately had a most striking and memorable example. -=-

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be ruinous to the revenue to give, we must, therefore, never expect that the augmentation of taxes will take place without an increase of discontent, or, at least, an augmented indifference towards government.

Perhaps nothing evinces more the general feeling, (even of the respectable part of society,) with regard to the revenues of the state, than the disposition to profit by evading the payment of duties imposed upon articles of consumption.

The most respectable of the nobility or gentry will conceal a contraband article, or one on which there is a heavy duty, on their return from abroad:  and what is more, if detected, they are more ashamed, on account of their want of address, than on account of the crime; for such it is, whatever custom may have taught us to think.

A man who is rigorously treated, by what is commonly called a lawful creditor, whom he would never attempt to defraud must naturally feel doubly incensed, when still more rigorously treated by one whom he would think it very little harm, and no disgrace, to defraud.  It is then very clear, that, the common habits of thinking on the subject of debts due to the king, is such as does not favour taxation, or incline people to submit willingly to rigorous modes of recovery.