Perhaps the chief motive for submitting to the difficulties, the oppressions, and the burthens, which people submit to under republican forms of government arises in deception. They seem to be paying taxes to themselves, and for themselves, when, in reality, they are not doing so any more than under a monarchy, where the taxes, in proportion to the service done, are generally less than in a republic.{88}
—– {88} America is an exception, but then there is no similarity between the United States and any other country in the world. Their existence, as an independent country, is only of twenty-five years standing; they have had no wars during that time, and the revolutionary war cost little in actual money. The comparison between the states and other nations will not hold, but, if we compare the expense of their government now, and when under the British, it will be found they pay near thirty times as much; and, even allowing their population to have risen one-half, they still pay proportionately twenty times as much. Their revenue now amounts to 16,000,000 of dollars. The public expense, in 1795, when they revolted, was about 350,000 dollars. -=-
This was the case in Holland and Venice. In England, the first great increase of taxes took place under the long Parliament and Commonwealth.
The only administration carried on by delegated authority, that is from necessity obliged to be executed with unabaiting rigour, is the department of finance. Money is a thing of such a nature, that strict rules are absolutely necessary in its administration. There is here a great distinction between money and other property, or money’s worth. A menial servant, of whose honesty there is no proof, and even when it may be dubious, is habitually trusted with the care of property to a considerable amount, and the account rendered is seldom very rigorous; but, in the case of trusting with money, every precaution is first taken, as to being trust-worthy. Security is generally demanded, and neither friendship, confidence, nor the highest respectability, will supply the place of a strict account, which, when not rendered, leaves an indelible stain. There are many causes for this, but they are so generally understood, or, at least, so generally felt, that it is not necessary to examine them; the consequences are in some cases, however, not so evident. One of the most important is, that the accuracy with [end of page #103] which those appointed to collect taxes are obliged to render their accounts, compels them to a strictness in doing their duty that appears frequently rigorous to an extreme degree, and scarcely consistent with justice or humanity.
A king is considered as an unrelenting creditor, and he certainly appears in that character; but it should be considered why he is obliged to be so; for, as a master, he is generally the most indulgent in his dominions.