Though Poland was not wealthy, according to the meaning applied to that word, it was a populous and fertile country, and therefore a desirable possession to the neighbouring states.  To Prussia, a most ambitious and aggrandising power, with a military government, and of a very limited extent, it was peculiarly desirable.  To Russia, extensive as it is, the fruitful territory was also an object of ambition, from its proximity to the seat of an empire, the most fertile and fine provinces of which lie at a distance.  The same desire of possessing what they wanted, operating at the same time on two neighbouring nations, occasioned them to unite their power in a first dismemberment of Poland, for their mutual benefit.  The interior convulsions of the country served as a pretext, and its weakness furnished the means of executing the design.  In 1772, that independent country first lost some of its finest provinces; but this was only a prelude to its final fall.

The nature of ambition is to augment with success, and as the same divisions continued in the state, a pretence for a farther interference in its affairs was easily found; and, in 1794, Poland ceased to be one of the number of European states.  In this last seizure, the house of Austria had no immediate hand.  It was, however, necessary to have its consent:  and, as the aggrandisement of Prussia was not an object of indifference to Austria, participation in the spoils was proposed, as the price of acquiescence, and it was readily accepted.

In this case, the weakness of Poland, and the ambition of its rivals and neighbours, were the immediate causes of its destruction; but that weakness arose from a want of true patriotism and proper attention in the people themselves.  Jealous of liberties, and disobedient to their king, the Poles were slaves to the feudal proprietors of the soil.  Though the first cause was different, yet their divisions and quarrels were the same in effect, as if they had proceeded from real causes of discontent, and a deranged state of society, such as we have seen, when the love of the country is lost.  In Poland, that love of the country [end of page #76] was not lost, but it was badly directed, which is nearly the same thing; at least, it is equally dangerous.

Why, it may be asked, did not the other powers of Europe interfere?  To this, indeed, it would be difficult to give a satisfactory answer.  Those who did not interfere, probably, may have cause to repent their indifference.  It was an infraction of that sort of federation of nations, which had been found necessary to prevent a repetition of conquests like those of Alexander, or of the Romans; yet, still there is a way of accounting for their conduct, though it cannot be vindicated.

In the first place, Poland lays =sic= remote from those powerful nations that have had the greatest sway in modern times.  It was not very easy to interfere with great efficacy; besides, as Poland was previously under foreign influence, the essential evil was done.  The example of partitions, indeed, was not given, but it is not impossible that some powers on the continent, though they got no share, might not be sorry to see such an example.  Britain and Spain certainly could not wish for the example, but others might, and others probably did wish for it.