their power set aside; thus, when their opinion is most wanted, it is not allowed to be given.  Under such regulation, what real redress can be expected?  As for the taxing costs by a master, it is [end of page #279] rarely that a client, from prudential motives, dares appeal; and, when he does, the remedy is frequently worse than the disease; and, even in this case a lawyer judges a lawyer.  Without saying any thing against the judgments, it will be allowed, that in neither case is the principle of Magna Carta adhered to, of a man being judged by his peers; besides, in every other fraud there is punishment proportioned to the crime.  In this case there is no punishment, unless the extortion is exorbitant, and then the punishment is too great.  It ought to be proportioned to the offence, as in cases of usury, and then it would be effectual; but to let small misdemeanors go free and to punish great ones beyond measure is the way to elude punishment in all cases.  A man ought to pay his bill; let the attorney take the money at his peril, and let there be a court to judge fairly, at little expense, and with promptitude, and punish the extortion by a treble fine.  This would answer; but all regulations, relative to law, are left to the lawyers themselves; and the fable of the Man, the Lion, and the Picture, was never so well exemplified, Never, in any case, was redress more wanted; perhaps, never was it less likely to be had.

The unequal division of property, as has been shewn, arises partly from bad laws, and partly from neglect of regulation; it is, indeed, one of the most delicate points to interfere in; nevertheless, as it has been proved, that laws do already interfere between a man and the use of his property, (and that it is, in some cases, necessary that they should do so) the question is reduced to one of circumstances and expediency, it is not one to be determined, in the abstract, on principle.  It is also of too nice a nature to be touched roughly by general regulation; but, if large estates in land, and large farms, were taxed higher in proportion than small ones, it would counteract, to a certain degree, the tendency of landed property to accumulate in any one person’s hand; and, except in land, property seldom remains long enough in one family to accumulate to a dangerous degree. {213}

—–­ {213} Besides the above truth, of other property being liable to be dissipated from its nature the law of primogeniture does not attach on it, and the evil, if it did, would not be any way considerable. -=-

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The increased consumption of a nation, which we have found one of the causes of decline that increases with its wealth, may be more effectually prevented than any other; not by interfering with the mode in which individuals expend their wealth, but by managing it so that vegetable food shall always be in abundance; and if so, the high prices of animal food, and the low price of vegetables will answer the purpose of counteracting the taste for the former, which is the cause of the dearth, and brings on depopulation; and therefore its hurtful effect will be prevented. {214}