—–­ {212} An act of parliament for a new tax is seldom ever right till it has been evaded a number of times, and even then in perfectioning =sic= it, an increase of revenue is the only object attended to; the conveniency of the subject is scarcely ever thought of.  Taxes are laid on, that experience proves to be unproductive and oppressive, and sometimes are, and oftener ought, to be repealed; thousands of persons are sometimes ruined for a mere experiment.  As the public pays for it, they, at least, might be indulged with a little attention; nothing costs less than civility.  If half the attention were paid to preventing unnecessary trouble to the subject, [end of page #278] in cases of taxation, that is paid to the preservation of partridges, we should have the thing very differently managed.  There should also be a public office, to hear just complaints against those who give unnecessary trouble, as there is for hackney coachmen.  Men in all situations require to be under some controul, where they have power.  Most of those who drive others, go wrong sometimes, unless held in check by some authority. -=-

The encroachments of separate bodies on the public, it is entirely in the power of the state to prevent.  It is owing to weakness or carelessness, or ignorance, that governments admit of such encroachments, and they are easily to be prevented, partly, as has been shewn, by positive regulation, and partly by counteracting them, whenever they appear to be proceeding in a direction any way doubtful.  When they do so, the conclusion may be, that they are working for themselves; and, in that case, they ought to be very minutely examined into; and, as all public bodies, and men belonging to a class that has a particular interest generally derive their means of trenching on the public from government, it may very easily controul their action, or counteract the effect.

As lawyers have the administration of justice amongst themselves; as the executive part is in their hand, the law-makers should be particularly careful to make them amenable by law for bad conduct; it ought not to be left in the bosom of a court, to strike off, or keep on, an improper man.  It is not right, on the one hand, that attorneys, or any set of men, should be subject to an arbitrary exertion of power; and it is equally unfair for them to be protected, by having those who are to judge between them and the public, always belonging to their own body.  In defence of this, it is said, that attornies are servants of the court, and that the business of the court being to do justice, their correction cannot be in better hands.  This is a tolerably ingenious assertion, if it were strictly true; but the court consists both of judge and jury; whereas, in this case, the judge assumes all the power; that is to say, when a case is to be determined relative to the conduct of a lawyer, a lawyer is to be the sole judge, and the jury, who represent the public, are to have