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In every assembly, a small number, who completely understand their own interest, can do a great deal, if they will act together; but, this is not all, they can use arguments with a minister that pave the way for obtaining the ends they have in view, while the general interests of the country alarm no one but upon great occasions.

Under arbitrary monarchs, all bodies with separate interests, are kept in due order, they have no means of defending themselves but by remonstrance, which, against power, is but a very inadequate protection.

There is nothing forced or chimerical in this statement of the case, and the consequence is, that no country ever saw any bodies rise to such a height, except the clergy in Roman Catholic countries, and the barons during the feudal system, when they had arms in their hands; who, if they could not absolutely resist their sovereign, were at least able to refuse him aid, and could annoy him greatly.  But those examples will bear no comparison with the separate interests in England at this time.  The barons have long lost their power, and the Roman Catholic clergy have lost the greatest part of their power and revenue also.  If they had not, wealthy and powerful kingdoms would not have existed.

Under a free government, where people think that an opposition to a minister in parliament is a most excellent thing, the energies of the nation, as to war, are greatly lessened.  This must, in its connections with other nations, produce very hurtful effects; but, where the evil is without a remedy, there is no advantage in dwelling upon it; and it does not appear that there is any possibility of separating from a free government, some sort of an opposing power, that must hamper the executive, and lessen the energies of the nation.

Under pure monarchies, kings can reward merit; they can encourage talents, and act according to circumstances.  In England, the king, or his ministers, have no fund from which they can do this.  An application to parliament is expensive and troublesome; and, in many cases, where the object would be fair, it would be unattainable.  But this is not all, for when, by act of parliament, any thing of the sort is [end of page #259] once done, it is left without proper controul, and the expense is generally double what it ought to be.

On the whole, there is too little of discretional =sic= power in a representative government; good cannot be done but by rules, which, in many cases, it is impossible to comply with.  This is a disadvantage which we labour under, and is a sort of drawback on our excellent form of government; but this is not like the opposition in the senate, it may be got over, and merits attention.

Such appear to be the disadvantages to which Britain is peculiarly liable, either in toto, or in the degree; but, on the other hand, she has many circumstances in her favour, if they are properly taken hold of; and, indeed, some, of which the effect will be favourable, whether any particular attention is paid to them or not.  To those we shall advert with peculiar pleasure, and hope that they will not be neglected, but that they may afford a means of continuing our career of prosperity on the increasing scale, or that, at least, they may prevent us from sharing the fate of those nations that have gone before.