At the end of ten years, the interest of the national debt would be reduced to one-half its present amount, which, together with the war-taxes, would be sufficient to prevent the necessity of creating more debt.  This, however, is not all, a more prompt effect and advantage may be expected.  It is more than probable, that the moment our enemy found that the nation, could, without any great exertion, put its finances on a permanent footing, the present contest would finish.  It is now only continued, in hopes of ruining our finances, and it is on the accumulation of the debt that the expectation of that is alone founded.

We observed, in the beginning of this Chapter, that most people are biased by hope or fear, in examining a question of great importance; and that, therefore, they do not state it quite fairly, without being sensible of their error.  In the case of the gloomy calculators of this country, fear and anxiety operated in causing a misstatement; but, with regard to our enemies, hope is the cause of their magnifying the effect of our national debt, and, it must be allowed, that hope had seldom ever a more easy business to perform.  The general conclusion is certain, and all the question that remains, is with respect to time.

The only mode of putting an end to this hope of our enemy, and to the war, at once, will be by shewing that enemy that it is quite out of his power to augment our debt, but untill =sic= a method shall be adopted by [end of page #244] us, that is PRACTICABLE AND EASILY UNDERSTOOD, that will not be believed by our enemy.

The rapidity of the operation of a sinking fund is easily calculated, but not so easily credited, particularly by people not inclined to do so, and who would not themselves have the constancy and self-denial to leave it time to operate.  Besides, by this operation, we shall not get free of debt till the taxes are raised far above their present amount.  Our enemies may be pardoned for believing it impracticable, particularly as many of our friends are of the same opinion.

France, which has always been the rival of this country, and hates it now more than ever, (envy being now an ingredient of its hatred,) knows well that it is fallen and degraded, that it has less wealth and happiness than England; but then it considers, that, however bad its finances may be, they are getting no worse; that to continue the war for twenty years will bring no more ruin on the nation, while half the term would probably ruin us.  Till we show the fallacy of this calculation, we cannot expect a durable peace.  Our ruin is become an object, not only of ambition, but of necessity, as it were, to France; and nothing but despair of being able to accomplish their object will make them abandon the attempt.

We must be permitted here to ask a few questions: 

Is not the time favourable for the plan here proposed?

Would it not be fair in its operation?