Before, however, we conclude this subject, and rely on government, it is necessary to mention that, in treating with other nations, a kind of overbearing haughty pride is natural to those who govern a powerful and wealthy people.  In that case, they act as individuals, and are not to be trusted; and the less so, that a nation of proud pampered citizens is but too apt to applaud insolence in those who govern them.

This pride has been a very constant forerunner of the fall of wealthy and great nations, and, in Rome excepted, it has never failed.  The emperors of Rome were much less haughty than the ambassadors of the republic; a love of false splendour had supplanted a ferocious affectation of dignity, yet, the former was the less humiliating of the two to other nations. {144}

While the rulers of wealthy nations are apt to act haughtily to others, they are liable to fall into another error, in mistaking the strength of their own people, and loading them too heavily, trusting too much both to their internal energy, and external force.

As the near observers of the inability of the people are generally afraid to carry unwelcome tidings to their superior; and, if they did, as he is seldom inclined to give credit to unwelcome news, the ruin of a nation has probably made a very considerable progress before he, whose business it is to put a stop to it, is aware of the danger.

The continual clamour that is made about every new burthen that is laid on, and the cry of ruin, which perpetually is sounded in the ears of a minister, and of those who execute his orders, are some ex-

—–­ {144} The appearance of virtue and self-command, which the republican Romans preserved, added to the bravery with which they maintained whatever claims they put in, overawed a great part of their enemies; and those, who were not absolutely overawed thought that defeat and submission were, at least, robbed of their shame, when such was the character of the conqueror; and the claim once allowed was no longer questioned.  Very different was the case, when the emperor was a fidler, or a buffoon, the senators puppets, and the pro-consuls themselves robbers. -=-

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cuses for their not attending to them; but the consequence is not the less fatal to the nation on that account.

A nation that is feeble has, at least, the advantage of knowing it, and is not insensible if she receives a wound; but the government of a powerful nation is like the pilot of a ship, who navigates in a sea, the depth of which he cannot sound, and who spreads all his sails:  if he strikes upon a rock, his ship is dashed to pieces in a moment.  The other, sailing amongst shallows and sands, proceeds with caution, avoids them if possible, and, if she touches, it is so gently, that even her feeble frame is scarcely injured.