The supposed case would be thus.  That a nation should rise to a high pitch of wealth by industry, and support a heavy load of taxes, still increasing in wealth, and superior to most other nations.  We are to suppose the load of taxes greatly diminished, and then to investigate the consequences.

Perhaps this is an useless hyyothesis =sic=, the case never has been, and perhaps never will be; but, still it is, at least, a possible case; it is a matter of curiosity, at least, if it is not one of utility, and I have a great example to plead as my apology.  Dr. Adam Smith amused himself in his inquiry into the causes of the wealth of nations =sic= in a similar manner, by a hypothesis concerning the taxation of the British colonies.

Supposing the pressure of necessity were to be suddenly taken away, those whose income is regulated by their efforts would relax in exertion; that is to say, the productive labourers of the country would relax, while those whose incomes are fixed, that is principally [end of page #167] the unproductive labourers, would become comparatively more opulent, and their luxury would increase.

This is an effect very different from what the public expects.  The most useful class would gain little or nothing, while the drones of society would find their wealth greatly augmented, which would be one of the most unfortunate effects that could well be conceived, and might very soon bring about a very serious and disagreeable event.

In the course of investigating the national debt of England, in the Fourth Book =sic—­there is none.=, it will be necessary to examine this at length, but, there it will be attended with another circumstance, not one of general consideration; (as national debt is not any general or necessary appendage to a government) namely, the letting loose a great monied capital, which must either be employed here, or it will seek employment in another country, which may rise on the ruin of this.

In considering the reduction of taxes that have been long standing, and have risen to a great amount, there is certainly reason to fear evil consequences, though this is no argument in favour of taxation; on the contrary, it is a reason for avoiding it, for, it is in all cases dangerous to do what it will be attended with danger to undo.

Though the precise case of taxes being done away may never come before us, there is, at this time, an operation going on that is nearly similar, and the result of which will soon be known.

The French people were loaded with nearly twenty-five millions sterling annually to the church, and they do not now pay three.  This, indeed, was partly in taxes, and part in church-lands; they have also got rid of a great deal of rent, by the sale of emigrant estates, the lands have got into the hands of men, who mostly cultivate them themselves, and have no rent to pay.