The Armistice is the basis of the Convention; and in the first article we find it agreed, ’That there shall be a suspension of hostilities between the forces of his Britannic Majesty, and those of his Imperial and Royal Majesty, Napoleon I.’  I will ask if it be the practice of military officers, in instruments of this kind, to acknowledge, in the person of the head of the government with which they are at war, titles which their own government—­for which they are acting—­has not acknowledged.  If this be the practice, which I will not stop to determine, it is grossly improper; and ought to be abolished.  Our Generals, however, had entered Portugal as Allies of a Government by which this title had been acknowledged; and they might have pleaded this circumstance in mitigation of their offence; but surely not in an instrument, where we not only look in vain for the name of the Portugueze Sovereign, or of the Government which he appointed, or of any heads or representatives of the Portugueze armies or people as a party in the contract,—­but where it is stipulated (in the 4th article) that the British General shall engage to include the Portugueze armies in this Convention.  What an outrage!—­We enter the Portugueze territory as Allies; and, without their consent—­or even consulting them, we proceed to form the basis of an agreement, relating—–­ not to the safety or interests of our own army—­but to Portugueze territory, Portugueze persons, liberties, and rights,—­and engage, out of our own will and power, to include the Portugueze army, they or their Government willing or not, within the obligation of this agreement.  I place these things in contrast, viz. the acknowledgement of Bonaparte as emperor and king, and the utter neglect of the Portugueze Sovereign and Portugueze authorities, to shew in what spirit and temper these agreements were entered upon.  I will not here insist upon what was our duty, on this occasion, to the Portugueze—­as dictated by those sublime precepts of justice which it has been proved that they and the Spaniards had risen to defend,—­and without feeling the force and sanctity of which, they neither could have risen, nor can oppose to their enemy resistance which has any hope in it; but I will ask, of any man who is not dead to the common feelings of his social nature—­and besotted in understanding, if this be not a cruel mockery, and which must have been felt, unless it were repelled with hatred and scorn, as a heart-breaking insult.  Moreover, this conduct acknowledges, by implication, that principle which by his actions the enemy has for a long time covertly maintained, and now openly and insolently avows in his words—­that power is the measure of right;—­and it is in a steady adherence to this abominable doctrine that his strength mainly lies.  I do maintain then that, as far as the conduct of our Generals in framing these instruments tends to reconcile men to this course of action, and to sanction this principle, they are