letter, for deeming a Convention adviseable.
A want of cavalry, (for which they who occasioned
it are heavily censurable,) has indeed been proved;
and certain failures of duty in the Commissariat department
with respect to horses, &c.; but these deficiencies,
though furnishing reasons against advancing upon the
enemy in the open field, had ceased to be of moment,
when the business was to expel him from the forts
to which he might have the power of retreating.
It is proved, that, though there are difficulties in
landing upon that coast, (and what military or marine
operation can be carried on without difficulty?) there
was not the slightest reason to apprehend that the
army, which was then abundantly supplied, would suffer
hereafter from want of provisions; proved also that
heavy ordnance, for the purpose of attacking the forts,
was ready on ship-board, to be landed when and where
it might be needed. Therefore, so far from being
exculpated by the facts which have been laid before
the Board of Inquiry, Sir Hew Dalrymple and the other
Generals, who deemed any Convention necessary
or expedient upon the grounds stated in his letter,
are more deeply criminated. But grant, (for the
sake of looking at a different part of the subject,)
grant a case infinitely stronger than Sir Hew Dalrymple
has even hinted at;—why was not the taste
of some of those evils, in apprehension so terrible,
actually tried? It would not have been the first
time that Britons had faced hunger and tempests, had
endured the worst of such enmity, and upon a call,
under an obligation, how faint and feeble, compared
with that which the brave men of that army must have
felt upon the present occasion! In the proclamation
quoted before, addressed to the Portugueze, and signed
Charles Cotton and Arthur Wellesley, they were told,
that the objects, for which they contended, ’could
only be attained by distinguished examples of fortitude
and constancy.’ Where were the fortitude
and constancy of the teachers? When Sir Hew Dalrymple
had been so busy in taking the measure of his own
weakness, and feeding his own fears, how came it to
escape him, that General Junot must also have had
his weaknesses and his fears? Was
it nothing to have been defeated in the open field,
where he himself had been the assailant? Was
it nothing that so proud a man, the servant of so
proud a man, had stooped to send a General Officer
to treat concerning the evacuation of the country?
Was the hatred and abhorrence of the Portugueze and
Spanish Nations nothing? the people of a large metropolis
under his eye—detesting him, and stung almost
to madness, nothing? The composition of his own
army made up of men of different nations and languages,
and forced into the service,—was there
no cause of mistrust in this? And, finally, among
the many unsound places which, had his mind been as
active in this sort of inquiry as Sir Hew Dalrymple’s
was, he must have found in his constitution, could
a bad cause have been missed—a worse cause
than ever confounded the mind of a soldier when boldly
pressed upon, or gave courage and animation to a righteous
assailant? But alas! in Sir Hew Dalrymple and
his brethren, we had Generals who had a power of sight
only for the strength of their enemies and their own
weakness.