and traders were capable of rivalling us in point of skill, that any Frenchman would venture upon that ostentatious display of wealth which a large cotton-mill, for instance, requires, when he knows that by so doing he would only draw upon himself a glance of the greedy eye of government, soon to be followed by a squeeze from its rapacious hand?  But I have dwelt too long upon this.  The sum of what I think, by conversation, I could convince you of is, that your comparative estimate is erroneous, and materially so, inasmuch as it makes no allowance for the increasing superiority which a State, supposed to be independent and equitable in its dealings to its subjects, must have over an oppressive government; and none for the time which is necessary to give prosperity to peaceful arts, even if the government should improve.  Our country has a mighty and daily growing forest of this sort of wealth; whereas, in France, the trees are not yet put into the ground.  For my own part, I do not think it possible that France, with all her command of territory and coast, can outstrip us in naval power, unless she could previously, by her land power, cut us off from timber and naval stores, necessary for the building and equipment of our fleet.  In that intellectual superiority which, as I have mentioned, we possess over her, we should find means to build as many ships as she could build, and also could procure sailors to man them.  The same energy would furnish means for maintaining the men; and if they could be fed and maintained, they would surely be produced.  Why then am I for war with France? 1st.  Because I think our naval superiority may be more cheaply maintained, and more easily, by war than by peace; and because I think, that if the war were conducted upon those principles of martial policy which you so admirably and nobly enforce, united with (or rather bottomed upon) those notions of justice and right, and that knowledge of and reverence for the moral sentiments of mankind, which, in my Tract, I attempted to portray and illustrate, the tide of military success would immediately turn in our favour; and we should find no more difficulty in reducing the French power than Gustavus Adolphus did in reducing that of the German Empire in his day.  And here let me express my zealous thanks for the spirit and beauty with which you have pursued, through all its details, the course of martial policy which you recommend.  Too much praise cannot be given to this which is the great body of your work.  I hope that it will not be lost upon your countrymen.  But (as I said before) I rather wish to dwell upon those points in which I am dissatisfied with your ‘Essay.’  Let me then come at once to a fundamental principle.  You maintain, that as the military power of France is in progress, ours must be so also, or we must perish.  In this I agree with you.  Yet you contend also, that this increase or progress can only be brought about by conquests permanently established upon the