It may be objected that—­since Sir J.M. no where alleges these events as proving any thing against the Spaniards, but simply as accounting for his own plans (in which view, howsoever effected, whether with or without due resistance, they were entitled to the same value)—­it is unfair to say that, by giving them uncircumstantially, he has misrepresented them.  But it must be answered, that, in letters containing elsewhere (though not immediately in connexion with these statements) opinions unfavourable to the Spaniards, to omit any thing making for them—­is to misrepresent in effect.  And, further, it shall now be shewn that even those three charges—­which Sir J.M. does allege in proof of his opinions—­are as glaringly mis-stated.

The first of these charges is the most important:  I give it to the reader in the words of Sir John Moore:—­’The French cavalry from Burgos, in small detachments, are over-running the province of Leon; raising contributions; to which the inhabitants submit without the least resistance.’  Now here it cannot be meant that no efforts at resistance were made by individuals or small parties; because this would not only contradict the universal laws of human nature,—­but would also be at utter variance with Sir J.M.’s repeated complaints that he could gain no information of what was passing in his neighbourhood.  It is meant therefore that there was no regular organised resistance; no resistance such as might be made the subject of an official report.  Now we all know that the Spaniards have every where suffered deplorably from a want of cavalry; and, in the absence of that, hear from a military man (Major-Gen. Brodrick) why there was no resistance:  ’—­At that time I was not aware how remarkably the plains of Leon and Castille differ from any other I have seen; nor how strongly the circumstances, which constitute that difference, enforce the opinion I venture to express.’  (He means the necessity of cavalry reinforcements from England.) ’My road from Astorga lay through a vast open space, extending from 5 to 20 or more miles on every side; without a single accident of ground which could enable a body of infantry to check a pursuing enemy, or to cover its own retreat.  In such ground, any corps of infantry might be insulted, to the very gates of the town it occupied, by cavalry far inferior in numbers; contributions raised under their eyes, and the whole neighbourhood exhausted of its resources, without the possibility of their opposing any resistance to such incursions.’

The second charge is made on the retreat to Corunna:  ’the Gallicians, though armed,’ Sir J.M. says, ’made no attempt to stop the passage of the French through the mountains.’  That they were armed—­is a proof that they had an intention to do so (as one of our journals observed):  but what encouragement had they in that intention from the sight of a regular force—­more than 30,000 strong—­abandoning, without a struggle, passes where (as an English general asserts) ’a body of a thousand men might stop an army of twenty times the number?’