In treating of this plan—­I have presumed that a General might be placed at the head of this great military power who would not sign a Treaty like that of the Convention of Cintra, and say (look at the proceedings of the Board of Inquiry) that he was determined to this by ’British interests;’ or frame any Treaty in the country of an Ally (save one purely military for the honourable preservation, if necessary, of his own army or part of it) to which the sole, or even the main, inducement was—­our interests contra-distinguished from those of that Ally;—­a General and a Ministry whose policy would be comprehensive enough to perceive that the true welfare of Britain is best promoted by the independence, freedom, and honour of other Nations; and that it is only by the diffusion and prevalence of these virtues that French Tyranny can be ultimately reduced; or the influence of France over the rest of Europe brought within its natural and reasonable limits.

If this attempt be ‘above the strain and temper’ of the country, there remains only a plan laid down upon the other principles; namely, service (as far as is required) in things rather than in men; that is, men being secondary to things.  It is not, I fear, possible that the moral sentiments of the British Army or Government should accord with those of Spain in her present condition.  Commanding power indeed (as hath been said), put forth in the repulse of the common enemy, would tend, more effectually than any thing save the prevalence of true wisdom, to prevent disagreement, and to obviate any temporary injury which the moral spirit of the Spaniards might receive from us:  at all events—­such power, should there ensue any injury, would bring a solid compensation.  But from a middle course—­an association sufficiently intimate and wide to scatter every where unkindly passions, and yet unable to attain the salutary point of decisive power—­no good is to be expected.  Great would be the evil, at this momentous period, if the hatred of the Spaniards should look two ways.  Let it be as steadily fixed upon the French, as the Pilot’s eye upon his mark.  Military stores and arms should be furnished with unfailing liberality:  let Troops also be supplied; but let these act separately,—­taking strong positions upon the coast, if such can be found, to employ twice their numbers of the Enemy; and, above all, let there be floating Armies—­keeping the Enemy in constant uncertainty where he is to be attacked.  The peninsula frame of Spain and Portugal lays that region open to the full shock of British warfare.  Our Fleet and Army should act, wherever it is possible, as parts of one body—­a right hand and a left; and the Enemy ought to be made to feel the force of both.