I will not suppose that any ministry of this country can be so abject, so insensible, and unwise, as to abandon the Spaniards and Portugueze while there is a Patriot in arms; or, if the people should for a time be subjugated, to deny them assistance the moment they rise to require it again.  I cannot think so unfavourably of my country as to suppose this possible.  Let men in power, however, take care (and let the nation be equally careful) not to receive any reports from our army—­of the disposition of the Spanish people—­without mistrust.  The British generals, who were in Portugal (the whole body of them,[21] according to the statement of Sir Hew Dalrymple), approved of the Convention of Cintra; and have thereby shewn that their communications are not to be relied upon in this case.  And indeed there is not any information, which we can receive upon this subject, that is so little trustworthy as that which comes from our army—­or from any part of it.  The opportunities of notice, afforded to soldiers in actual service, must necessarily be very limited; and a thousand things stand in the way of their power to make a right use of these.  But a retreating army, in the country of an Ally;—­harrassed and dissatisfied; willing to find a reason for its failures in any thing but itself, and actually not without much solid ground for complaint; retreating; sometimes, perhaps, fugitive; and, in its disorder, tempted (and even forced) to commit offences upon the people of the district through which it passes; while they, in their turn, are filled with fear and inconsiderate anger;—­an army, in such a condition, must needs be incapable of seeing objects as they really are; and, at the same time, all things must change in its presence, and put on their most unfavourable appearances.

[21] From this number, however, must be excepted the gallant and patriotic General Ferguson.  For that officer has had the virtue publicly and in the most emphatic manner, upon two occasions, to reprobate the whole transaction.

Deeming it then not to be doubted that the British government will continue its endeavours to support its Allies; one or other of two maxims of policy follows obviously from the painful truths which we have been considering:—­Either, first, that we should put forth to the utmost our strength as a military power—­strain it to the very last point, and prepare (no erect mind will start at the proposition) to pour into the Peninsula a force of two hundred thousand men or more,—­and make ourselves for a time, upon Spanish ground, principals in the contest; or, secondly, that we should direct our attention to giving support rather in Things than in Men.