That afternoon General Anson received a letter from Sir John Lawrence urging the importance of an immediate advance on Delhi, and giving an outline of the measures he proposed to adopt in the Punjab.  He asked the Commander-in-Chief to give a general sanction to the arrangements, and concluded with these words:  “I consider this to be the greatest crisis which has ever occurred in India.  Our European force is so small that, unless effectively handled in the outset, and brought to bear, it will prove unequal to the emergency.  But with vigour and promptitude, under the blessing of God, it will prove irresistible.”

Anson naturally hesitated to advance with an inefficient and only partially equipped force against a strongly-fortified city with an immense armed population, defended by many thousand desperate mutineers, and in his reply (dated the 17th May) he put the case plainly before Sir John Lawrence.  He pointed out that the Europeans were without tents; that there were no guns at Umballa or Meerut heavier than six or nine pounders with which to batter down the walls of Delhi; that the required amount of carriage could not be provided in less than sixteen or twenty days; and that the three Native corps at Umballa could not be depended upon.  He asked Sir John whether he considered ’it would be prudent to risk the small European force we have here in an enterprise against Delhi,’ and he wrote:  ’My own view of the state of things now is, by carefully collecting our resources, having got rid of the bad materials which we cannot trust, and having supplied their places with others of a better sort, it would not be very long before we could proceed, without a chance of failure, in whatever direction we might please.’  Adding, ’this is now the opinion of all here whom I have consulted—­the Major-General and Brigadier, the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General and Commissary-General.’  Anson concluded his letter with the following words:  ’It would give me great satisfaction to have your views upon the present crisis, for I would trust to them more than to my experience.’

John Lawrence, who was straining every nerve to check the Mutiny and prevent a general rising of the population, was impatient at the idea of delay, and lost no time in giving Anson his opinion.  He telegraphed it briefly on the 20th, and the following day he wrote to the effect that he knew Delhi well, having been stationed there for nearly thirteen years, and it seemed incredible to him that mutineers could hold and defend it; his belief was ’that, with good management on the part of the civil officers, it would open its gates on the approach of our troops.’  He admitted that ’on military principles, in the present state of affairs, it may not be expedient to advance on Delhi until the Meerut force is prepared to act.’  But he protested against European soldiers being ’cooped up in their cantonments, tamely awaiting the progress of events.’  He went on to say:  ’Pray only reflect on the whole history of India.  Where have we failed when we acted vigorously?  Where have we succeeded when guided by timid counsels?  Clive with 1,200 men fought at Plassy, in opposition to the advice of his leading officers, beat 40,000 men, and conquered Bengal.’