At Meerut the European troops were entrenching themselves; the surrounding district was in the most complete disorder, and the civil courts powerless.

At Umballa and Jullundur, although the presence of European troops had hitherto kept the Native regiments from open mutiny, it was evident that they were not in the least to be depended upon.

At Ferozepore an aggravated revolt had occurred, and at Lahore it had been found necessary to disarm all the Native troops.

From below Meerut there was no intelligence whatever, but it seemed more than probable that the spirit of rebellion had broken out in many stations, and later this was known to be the case.

To add to the Commander-in-Chief’s anxieties, it was reported that the Nasiri battalion at Jutog had got out of hand for a time and refused to march to Philour, while a detachment of the same corps at Kasauli plundered the treasury, rendering it necessary to send back 100 men of the 75th Foot to reinforce the depot at that place, where a large number of European soldiers’ families were collected.

The behaviour of the Gurkhas gave rise to a panic at Simla, which, however, did not last long.  Lord William Hay,[5] who was Deputy-Commissioner at the time, induced most of the ladies, with their children, to seek a temporary asylum with the Raja of Kiunthal.[6] Hay himself managed to keep Simla quiet, and the men of the Nasiri battalion coming to their senses, order was restored throughout the hills.  The money taken from the Kasauli treasury was nearly all voluntarily given up, and before the year was out the battalion did us good service.

It was a long list of troubles that was placed before the Commander-in-Chief.  Disturbing as they all were, each requiring prompt and special action, there was one amongst them which stood out in bold relief—­the situation at Delhi; and to wrest that stronghold from the hands of the mutineers was, General Anson conceived, his most pressing obligation.  But could it be done with the means at his disposal?  He thought not; and in this opinion he was supported by the senior officers at Umballa, with whom the question was anxiously discussed at a conference held at Sir Henry Barnard’s house on the 16th May.[7] It was nevertheless determined to push on to Delhi, and General Hewitt was asked what force he could spare from Meerut to co-operate with the Umballa column.  He was warned that time was an object, and that the 23rd May was the date on which his troops would probably be required to start.  All details were carefully considered.  The first difficulty to be overcome was the want of carriage.  No organized system of transport—­one of the most essential requirements of an efficient army—­existed, and, owing to the restlessness and uncertainty which prevailed throughout the country, the civil authorities were unable to collect carts and camels with the usual rapidity.[8]