On the 30th July, I dined with Stewart, and, leaving his mess-tent at an early hour, I retired to my own quarters, and wrote out the following telegram in cipher, but, before despatching it, I showed it to Stewart, for, although I knew that his views were in accord with mine, I could not with propriety have sent it without his knowledge: 

    ’To Major-General Greaves,[6] Adjutant-General in India, Simla.

    ’Kabul,
    ’30th July, 1880.

’Personal and secret.  I strongly recommend that a force be sent from this to Kandahar.  Stewart has organized a very complete one consisting of nine regiments of Infantry, three of Cavalry, and three Mountain batteries.  This will suffice to overcome all opposition en route; it will have the best possible effect on the country, and will be ready to go anywhere on reaching Kandahar, being fully equipped in all respects.  He proposes sending me in command.

’I am sure that but few Bombay regiments are able to cope with Afghans, and once the Kabul Field Force leaves this country, the chance of sending a thoroughly reliable and well-equipped column will be lost.  The movement of the remainder of the Kabul troops towards India should be simultaneous with the advance of my division towards Kandahar, it being most desirable to limit the area of our responsibilities as soon as possible; at the same time, it is imperative that we should now show our strength throughout Afghanistan.  The withdrawal, under existing circumstances, of the whole force from Kabul to India would certainly be misunderstood, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere.  You need have no fears about my division.  It can take care of itself, and will reach Kandahar under the month.  I will answer for the loyalty and good feeling of the Native portion, and would propose to inform them that, as soon as matters have been satisfactorily settled at Kandahar, they will be sent straight back to India.  Show this to Lyall.’

Exaggerated reports of the Maiwand affair being rife in the Kabul bazaars, which were daily becoming crowded with armed Afghans from Abdur Rahman’s camp, and the prospect of troops having to leave at once for Kandahar, made it more than ever necessary to bring the negotiations with the new Amir to a speedy conclusion.  It was accordingly arranged that Mr. Griffin should meet him at Zimma, about sixteen miles from Kabul.  This interview had the happiest results, and must have been extremely gratifying to Mr. Griffin, whom we all heartily congratulated on the successful ending to the very delicate and difficult negotiations which he had carried on with so much skill and patience.