[Footnote 14:  These men were much impeded by their long boots and their swords dangling between their legs; the sight, indeed, of Cavalry soldiers trying to defend themselves on foot without a firearm confirmed the opinion I had formed during the Mutiny, as to the desirability for the carbine being slung on the man’s back when going into action.  Lieutenant-Colonel Bushman (Colonel Cleland’s successor) curiously enough had brought with him from England a sling which admitted of this being done, and also of the carbine being carried in the bucket on all ordinary occasions.  This pattern was adopted, and during the remainder of the campaign the men of the 9th Lancers placed their carbines on their backs whenever the enemy were reported to be in sight.  At the same time I authorized the adoption of an arrangement—­also brought to my notice by Colonel Bushman—­by which the sword was fastened to the saddle instead of round the man’s body.  This mode of wearing the sword was for some time strenuously opposed in this country, but its utility could not fail to be recognized, and in 1891 an order was issued sanctioning its adoption by all mounted troops.]

* * * * *

CHAPTER LVI. 1879

  Attack on the Takht-i-Shah—­City people join the tribesmen
  —­Increasing numbers of the enemy—­Loss of the conical hill
  —­Captain Vousden’s gallantry—­The retirement to Sherpur

On the morning of the 12th I was cheered by hearing that the Guides had arrived during the night under the command of Colonel P. Jenkins—­a most welcome reinforcement, for I knew how thoroughly to be depended upon was every man in that distinguished corps.

The first thing now to be done was to endeavour to drive the Afghans from the crest of the Takht-i-Shah; and I directed Macpherson, as soon as his men had breakfasted, to attack the position from Deh-i-Mazang.  Just then my mind was considerably relieved by a heliogram from Baker informing me that he was on his way back to Kabul.  The message was despatched from near Kila Kazi, within four miles of which place Baker had encamped on the afternoon of the previous day.

Macpherson deputed the task of trying to dislodge the enemy to Lieutenant-Colonel Money, of the 3rd Sikhs, with a detachment consisting of 2 Mountain guns and 560 British and Native Infantry.

It was a most formidable position to attack.  The slopes leading up to it were covered with huge masses of jagged rock, intersected by perpendicular cliffs, and its natural great strength was increased by breastworks, and stockades thrown up at different points.

After a gallant and persistent attempt had been made, I ordered the assault to be deferred; for I perceived that the enemy were being reinforced from their rear, and to ensure success without great loss, it would be necessary to attack them in rear as well as in the front.  The arrival of Baker’s brigade made it possible to do this.  I therefore ordered Macpherson to hold the ground of which he had gained possession until Baker could co-operate with him next morning from the Beni Hissar side.