The city of Kabul remained perfectly quiet while all the excitement I have described was going on outside.  Hills, with a few Sikhs, patrolled the principal streets, and even when the Afghan standard appeared on the Takht-i-Shah there was no sign of disturbance.  Nevertheless, I thought it would be wise to withdraw from the city; I could not tell how long the people would remain well disposed, or whether they would assist us to keep the enemy out.  I therefore directed Hills to come away and make over his charge to an influential Kizilbash named Futteh Khan.  I also telegraphed to General Bright at Jalalabad to reinforce Gandamak by a sufficient number of troops to hold that post in case it should be necessary to order Brigadier-General Charles Gough, who was then occupying it, to move his brigade nearer to Kabul; for I felt sure that, unless I could succeed in driving Mahomed Jan out of the neighbourhood of Kabul, excitement would certainly spread along my line of communication.  I concluded my message to Bright thus:  ’If the wire should be cut, consider it a bad sign, and push on to Gandamak, sending Gough’s Brigade towards Kabul.’

I could not help feeling somewhat depressed at the turn things had taken.  I had no news from Baker, and we had undoubtedly suffered a reverse, which I knew only too well would give confidence to the Afghans, who, from the footing they had now gained on the heights above Kabul, threatened the Bala Hissar, which place, stored as it was with powder and other material of war, I had found it necessary to continue to occupy.  Nevertheless, reviewing the incidents of the 11th December, as I have frequently done since, with all the concomitant circumstances deeply impressed on my memory, I have failed to discover that any disposition of my force different from that I made could have had better results, or that what did occur could have been averted by greater forethought or more careful calculation on my part.  Two deviations from my programme (which probably at the time appeared unimportant to the Commanders in question) were the principal factors in bringing about the unfortunate occurrences of that day.  Had Macpherson marched at 7 a.m. instead of 8, and had Massy followed the route I had arranged for him to take, Mahomed Jan must have fallen into the trap I had prepared for him.

Our casualties on the 11th were—­killed, 4 British officers, 16 British and 9 Native rank and file; wounded, 4 British officers, 1 Native officer, 20 British and 10 Native rank and file.

[Illustration:  SKETCH SHOWING THE OPERATIONS IN THE CHARDEH
    VALLEY ON DECEMBER 10TH AND 11TH, 1879]

[Footnote 1:  Fragrance of the universe.]

[Footnote 2:  Viz., Logar, Zurmat, the Mangal and Jadran districts, and the intervening Ghilzai country.]

[Footnote 3:  Kohistan.]

[Footnote 4:  Maidan and Ghazni.]

[Footnote 5:  Macpherson had with him the following troops:  4 guns R.H.A.; 4 guns Mountain battery; 1 squadron 9th Lancers; 2 squadrons 14th Bengal Lancers; 401 rifles 67th Foot; 509 rifles 3rd Sikhs; 393 rifles 5th Ghurkas.]