I now received a report from the rear that the road was blocked, and that the progress of Macpherson’s brigade would certainly be opposed; while, on the crests of the hills to the right and left of my camp, bodies of men began to assemble, who, I surmised (which surmise I afterwards learnt was correct), were only waiting for the sun to go down to make a general attack upon the camp under cover of dusk.

The situation was one of great anxiety.  The whole force with me was not more than 4,000 men and eighteen guns.  The treacherous Amir and his equally treacherous Ministers had, of course, kept the Afghan Commander fully informed as to the manner in which my troops were perforce divided; the position of every man and every gun with me was known; and I feared that, as soon as we were engaged with the enemy, the opportunity would be taken to attack my weakly-defended camp and to engage Macpherson’s small brigade, encumbered as it was with its large convoy of stores and ammunition.

The numbers of the enemy were momentarily increasing, so delay would assuredly make matters worse; the only chance of success, therefore, was to take the initiative, and attack the Afghan main position at once.  Accordingly, I sent an officer with orders to the troops who were moving towards the gorge not to commence work, but to take up a defensive position until my plans were further developed.  I sent another messenger to Macpherson, informing him of my intention to take immediate action, and telling him to keep a good look-out, and push on to Charasia with all possible speed, and at the same time I reinforced him by a squadron of Cavalry.

The Afghan position formed the arc of a circle, extending from the sang-i-nawishta gorge to the heights above Chardeh.  Both sides of the gorge were occupied by the enemy, as was a semi-detached hill to the south of it, and sixteen guns were observed in position.  The line they had taken up occupied nearly three miles of country; and their main position was the ridge, which, close to the gorge, rose 1,000 feet above the plain, running up at its western extremity to a peak 2,200 feet high.  Thence the line stretched along the edge of some lower heights to a rugged hill, the summit of which was about 1,800 feet above Charasia.  In front of this formidable position were a succession of sandy hills, forming a series of easily defensible posts, and at the foot of these hills ran a bare stony belt, sloping down to the cultivated land surrounding Charasia and the hamlet of Khairabad.

My movements and reconnaissances up till now having led the enemy to believe that I intended to deliver my attack on their left at the sang-i-nawishta, they were seen to be concentrating their forces in that direction.  But this position could only have been carried with such damaging loss to us that I determined to make the real attack by an outflanking movement to their right.

The men having made a hasty breakfast, I despatched General Baker in this direction, and placing at his disposal the troops noted below,[2] I entrusted to him the difficult task of dislodging the enemy, while I continued to distract their attention towards the gorge by making a feint to their left.