Before leaving Simla I paid a farewell visit to Lord Lytton.  I found him in a state of deep distress and depression.  To a man of his affectionate disposition, the fate of Cavagnari, for whom he had a great personal regard, was a real grief.  But on public grounds he felt still more strongly the collapse of the Mission and the consequent heavy blow to the policy he had so much at heart, viz., the rectification of our defective frontier, and the rendering India secure against foreign aggression—­a policy which, though scouted at the time by a party which later became all-powerful, has since been justified by the action of successive Governments, Liberal and Conservative alike, until at the present moment our frontier is gradually becoming what Lord Lytton, with his clear foresightedness and intelligent appreciation of our responsibilities and India’s requirements, would then have made it.

In answer to my request for instructions as to the line I should take about our future relations with the Afghans, Lord Lytton said:  ’You can tell them we shall never again altogether withdraw from Afghanistan, and that those who help you will be befriended and protected by the British Government.’

While I was with Lord Lytton, a telegram[10] was brought in from Captain Conolly, reporting the details of the attack upon the Embassy, as given to him by the messenger who had been entrusted by the Amir to deliver the two letters addressed to me.  In this telegram Conolly solicited instructions as to what he was to communicate to the Amir in reply to His Highness’s request for aid, and inquired whether he was at liberty to make terms with one Badshah Khan, an influential Ghilzai Chief, who had come to Alikhel to offer his services.

The following telegram was sent in reply by the Foreign Secretary: 

’Your telegram 6th.  Reply to the Amir at once from the Viceroy that a strong British force under General Roberts will march speedily on Kabul to his relief, from the Shutargardan, and that he should use all his resources to co-operate with, and facilitate, the advance of the troops through his country.  Your proposal to subsidize Badshah Khan and accept his services is approved.  Roberts will send detailed instructions.’

Late in the afternoon of the same day (September 6th) I left Simla, accompanied by my wife as far as Umballa, where I found my staff waiting for me.  She saw us off in the train, bidding us a cheery good-bye and good luck, but I am afraid the return journey must have been a sad one for her.

Thought for the immediate future filled my mind as we sped on our way to the front, and not a few difficulties connected with the proposed advance on Kabul presented themselves to me.  My chief causes for anxiety were the insufficiency of transport, and the great extent of the lines of communication which would have to be guarded.  It would be necessary to hold the country in strength from Thal to the Shutargardan, a distance of 115 miles, until such time as the Khyber route could be opened, and I felt that the force at my disposal (7,500 men and 22 guns) was none too large for the work before it, considering that I should have to provide a garrison for the Shutargardan, if not for other posts between that place and Kabul.