Cavagnari mentioned in one of his letters that the Afghan soldiers were inclined to be mutinous, and in another that a dispute had arisen in the bazaar between them and the men of the British escort, but at the same time he expressed his confidence in the Amir’s ability and determination to maintain order; I could not, however, help being anxious about Cavagnari, or divest myself of the feeling that he might be over-estimating Yakub Khan’s power, even if His Highness had the will, to protect the Mission.

Between one and two o’clock on the morning of the 5th September, I was awakened by my wife telling me that a telegraph man had been wandering round the house and calling for some time, but that no one had answered him.[1] I got up, went downstairs, and, taking the telegram from the man, brought it up to my dressing-room, and opened it; it proved to be from Captain Conolly, Political Officer at Alikhel, dated the 4th September.  The contents told me that my worst fears—­fears I had hardly acknowledged to myself—­had been only too fully realized.  The telegram ran: 

’One Jelaladin Ghilzai, who says he is in Sir Louis Cavagnari’s secret service, has arrived in hot haste from Kabul, and solemnly states that yesterday morning the Residency was attacked by three regiments who had mutinied for their pay, they having guns, and being joined by a portion of six other regiments.  The Embassy and escort were defending themselves when he left about noon yesterday.  I hope to receive further news.’

I was paralyzed for the moment, but was roused by my wife calling out, ‘What is it?  Is it bad news from Kabul?’ She had divined my fears about Cavagnari, and had been as anxious about him as I had been myself.  I replied, ‘Yes, very bad, if true.  I hope it is not.’  But I felt it was.  I woke my A.D.C., and sent him off at once to the Viceroy with the telegram.  The evil tidings spread rapidly.  I was no sooner dressed than Mr. Alfred Lyall arrived.  We talked matters over, I despatched a telegram[2] to Captain Conolly, and we then went off to Lord Lytton.

Early as it was, I found the Council assembled.  The gravity of the situation was thoroughly appreciated, and it was unanimously decided that, should the disastrous report prove to be true, troops must proceed to Kabul with the least possible delay to avenge or, if happily incorrect or exaggerated, to support the Mission.

Sir Samuel Browne’s force had been broken up, Sir Donald Stewart was in far off Kandahar, and his troops had, all but a small number, left on their return march to India; the Kuram force was, therefore, the only one in a position to reach Kabul quickly, and I was ordered to proceed at once to Kuram and resume my command.

As a preliminary measure, Brigadier-General Massy, who had been placed in temporary command during my absence, was directed to move troops to the Shutargardan, where they were to entrench themselves and await orders, while Stewart was directed to stop all regiments on their way back to India, and himself hold fast at Kandahar.