Lord Dalhousie was quite in accord with Edwardes.  He thought it very desirable to be on better terms with Kabul, but believed this to be a result difficult to attain.  ‘I give you,’ he said in a letter to Edwardes, carte blanche, and if you can only bring about such a result as you propose, it will be a new feather in your cap.’

Lord Dalhousie was supported by the British Government in his opinion as to the desirability of coming to a better understanding with the Amir.  War with Russia was then imminent, and the strained condition of European politics made it expedient that we should be on more amicable terms with Afghanistan.

The Governor-General thus wrote to Edwardes: 

’Prospects of a war between Russia and Turkey are watched with interest by all....  In England they are fidgety regarding this border beyond all reason, and most anxious for that declared amity and that formal renewal of friendly relations which you advocate in your letter.’

The balance of Indian opinion, however, was against our making overtures to Dost Mahomed.  John Lawrence, at that time the great power in the Punjab, was altogether opposed to Edwardes’s policy in this matter.  He admitted that it might be wise to renew intercourse with the Kabul ruler if he first expressed his regret for previous misunderstandings; but later he wrote to Edwardes: 

’I dare say you are right; still, I cannot divest myself of the idea that it is a mistake, and will end in mixing us up in Afghan politics and affairs more than is desirable.  The strength which a treaty can give us seems to be a delusion.  It will be like the reed on which, if a man lean, it will break and pierce his hand.’

John Nicholson, Outram, and James Abbott agreed with Lawrence.  They urged that any advance on our part would be looked upon as an indication of conscious weakness; and the probability was that an arrogant, irritated Mussulman ruler would regard an overture as a proof of our necessity, and would make our necessity his opportunity.  But Lord Dalhousie, while anxious to avoid any communication being made which could be liable to misconstruction, saw neither objection nor risk in opening the door to reconciliation, provided no undue anxiety was displayed on our part.  The Governor-General practically left the matter in the hands of Edwardes, who lost no time in trying to attain the desired object.  The greatest forbearance and diplomatic skill were necessary to bring the negotiations to a satisfactory termination, but they were concluded at last, most successfully, and to Edwardes alone is due the credit.  It is instructive to read the full record[1] of this tedious and difficult piece of diplomacy, for it serves as an interesting example of Oriental subtlety and circumlocution, contrasted with the straightforward dealing of a high-minded Englishman.