The Punjab Government advocated the despatch of a very strong force.  Accordingly, two columns were employed, the base of one being in the Peshawar valley, and that of the other in Hazara.  The Peshawar column was to move by the Umbeyla Pass, the Buner frontier, and the Chamla valley, thus operating on the enemy’s line of retreat.  This route would not have been chosen, had not Chamberlain been assured by the civil authorities that no hostility need be feared from the Bunerwals, even if their country had to be entered, as they had given no trouble for fifteen years, and their spiritual head, the Akhund of Swat,[2] had no sympathy with the fanatics.  It was not, therefore, considered necessary to warn the Buner people of our approach until preparations were completed; indeed, it was thought unadvisable to do so, as it was important to keep the proposed line of advance secret.  The strength of the force was 6,000 men, with 19 guns, but to make up these numbers the stations in Upper India had to be considerably weakened, and there was no reserve nearer than Lahore.

The Peshawar column[3] being all ready for a start, a Proclamation was forwarded to the Buner and other neighbouring tribes, informing them of the object of the expedition, and stating that there was no intention of interfering with them or their possessions.

On the following morning, the 20th October, the Umbeyla Pass was entered, and by noon the kotal[4] was reached without any resistance to speak of; but, from information brought in, it was evident that any further advance would be stoutly opposed.  The road turned out to be much more difficult than had been anticipated, and the hurriedly collected transport proved unequal to the strain.  Not a single baggage animal, except the ammunition mules, got up that night; indeed, it was not until the morning of the 22nd—­more than forty-eight hours after they started—­that the rear guard reached the kotal, a distance of only six miles.  As soon as it arrived Colonel Alex.  Taylor, R.E., was sent off with a body of Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Probyn, to reconnoitre the road in front.  The delay in reaching the top of the pass had given the tribes time to collect, and when the reconnoitring party entered the Chamla valley the Bunerwals could be seen about two miles and a half off, occupying in force the range which separates Buner and Chamla.  Whatever may have been their first intention, they apparently could not resist the temptation to try and cut off this small body of Cavalry, for our horsemen on their return journey found a large number of the trusted Buner tribe attempting to block the mouth of the pass.  A charge was made, but mounted men could not do much in such a hilly country; the proceedings of the Bunerwals, however, had been observed from the kotal, and Major Brownlow,[5] with some of his own regiment (the 20th Punjab Infantry), was sent to the assistance of the party.  A hand-to-hand fight ensued, and the enemy pressed our troops closely on their way back, coming right in amongst them with the utmost daring.