Windham eventually had at his disposal about 1,700 Infantry and eight guns, the greater part of which were encamped as directed, outside the city, close to the junction of the Delhi and Kalpi roads, while the rest were posted in and around the entrenchment.  Meanwhile the rebels were slowly approaching Cawnpore in detachments, with the evident intention of surrounding the place.  On the 17th two bodies of troops were pushed on to Shuli and Shirajpur, within fifteen miles of the city, and a little less than that distance from each other.  Windham thought that if he could manage to surprise either of these, he could prevent the enemy from concentrating, and he drew up a scheme for giving effect to this plan, which he submitted for the approval of the Commander-in-Chief.  No reply came, and after waiting a week he gave up all idea of attempting to surprise the detachments, and determined to try and arrest the rebels’ advance by attacking the main body, still some distance off.  Accordingly he broke up his camp, and marched six miles along the Kalpi road, on the same day that the Gwalior force moved some distance nearer to Cawnpore.  The next morning, the 25th, the enemy advanced to Pandu Naddi, within three miles of Windham’s camp.

Windham now found himself in a very critical position.  With only 1,200 Infantry[6] and eight light guns, he was opposed to Tantia Topi with an army of 25,000 men and forty guns.  He had to choose whether he would fight these enormous odds or retire:  he decided that to fight was the least of the two evils, and he was so far successful that he drove back that portion of the opposing force immediately in his front, and captured three guns; but being unable to press his advantage on account of the paucity of men and the total absence of Cavalry, he had perforce to fall back—­a grievous necessity.  He was followed the whole way, insulted and jeered at, by the rebel horsemen.  The result of the day was to give confidence to the wily Mahratta leader; he pushed on to Cawnpore, and attacked Windham with such vehemence that by nightfall on the 28th the British troops were driven inside the entrenchment, having had 315 men killed and wounded, and having lost all their baggage and camp equipage.

Windham undoubtedly laid himself open to censure.  His defence was that, had he received the Commander-in-Chief’s authority to carry out his plan for surprising the rebels, he would certainly have broken up their army, and the disaster could not have occurred.  But surely when he decided that circumstances had so changed since Sir Colin’s orders were given as to justify him in disregarding them, he should have acted on his own responsibility, and taken such steps as appeared to him best, instead of applying for sanction to a Commander far from the scene of action, and so entirely ignorant of the conditions under which the application was made, as to render it impossible for him to decide whether such sanction should be given.  The march which Windham made towards the enemy on the 24th was quite as grave a disobedience of orders as would have been the surprise movement he contemplated on the 17th; but while the former placed him in a most dangerous position, and one from which it was impossible to deal the enemy a decisive blow, the latter, if successful, would have deserved, and doubtless would have received, the highest praise.