The news I was able to give for the moment somewhat cheered the General, but did not altogether dispel his gloomy forebodings; and the failure of Campbell’s column (which just at that juncture returned to the church), the hopelessness of Nicholson’s condition, and, above all, the heavy list of casualties he received later, appeared to crush all spirit and energy out of him.  His dejection increased, and he became more than ever convinced that his wisest course was to withdraw from the city.  He would, I think, have carried out this fatal measure, notwithstanding that every officer on his staff was utterly opposed to any retrograde movement, had it not been his good fortune to have beside him a man sufficiently bold and resolute to stimulate his flagging energies.  Baird-Smith’s indomitable courage and determined perseverance were never more conspicuous than at that critical moment, when, though suffering intense pain from his wound, and weakened by a wasting disease, he refused to be put upon the sick-list; and on Wilson appealing to him for advice as to whether he should or should not hold on to the position we had gained, the short but decisive answer, ‘We must hold on,’ was given in such a determined and uncompromising tone that it put an end to all discussion.

Neville Chamberlain gave similar advice.  Although still suffering from his wound, and only able to move about with difficulty, he had taken up his position at Hindu Rao’s house, from which he exercised, as far as his physical condition would allow, a general supervision and control over the events that took place on the right of the Ridge.  He was accompanied by Daly and a very distinguished Native officer of the Guides, named Khan Sing Rosa, both of whom, like Chamberlain, were incapacitated by wounds from active duty.  From the top of Hindu Rao’s house Chamberlain observed the first successes of the columns, and their subsequent checks and retirements, and it was while he was there that he received two notes from General Wilson.  In the first, written after the failure of the attacks on the Jama Masjid and the Lahore gate, the General asked for the return of the Baluch battalion, which, at Chamberlain’s request, had been sent to reinforce Reid’s column, and in it he expressed the hope that ’we shall be able to hold what we have got.’  In the second note, written at four o’clock in the afternoon, the General asked whether Chamberlain ’could do anything from Hindu Rao’s house to assist,’ adding, ’our numbers are frightfully reduced, and we have lost so many senior officers that the men are not under proper control; indeed, I doubt if they could be got to do anything dashing.  I want your advice.  If the Hindu Rao’s piquet cannot be moved, I do not think we shall be strong enough to take the city.’  Chamberlain understood General Wilson’s second note to imply that he contemplated withdrawing the troops from the city, and he framed his reply accordingly.  In it he urged the necessity for holding on to the last; he