By the 6th September all the reinforcements that could be expected, including the siege train (consisting of thirty-two pieces of ordnance with ample ammunition) had arrived in camp, and the time had now come when it was necessary for Wilson to determine whether Delhi was to be assaulted, or whether the attempt must be given up.  Long exposure to sun and rain began to tell terribly on the troops; sickness increased to an alarming extent, and on the 31st August there were 2,368 men in hospital—­a number which, six days later, had risen to 2,977.

Norman, on whose figures implicit reliance can be placed, states that on this date the total number of effective rank and file of all arms, Artillery, Engineers, Cavalry, and Infantry, including gun-Lascars, Native drivers, newly-raised Sikh Pioneers, and recruits for the Punjab regiments, was 8,748.

The strength of the British troops was 3,217, composed of 580 Artillery, 443 Cavalry, and 2,294 Infantry.  The Infantry corps were mere skeletons, the strongest being only 409 effective rank and file.  The 52nd, which had arrived three weeks before with 600 healthy men, had already dwindled to 242 fit for duty.

The above numbers are exclusive of the Kashmir Contingent of 2,200 men and four guns, which had by this time reached Delhi; and several hundred men of the Jhind troops (previously most usefully employed in keeping open our communication with Kurnal) were, at the Raja’s particular request, brought in to share in the glory of the capture of Delhi, the Raja himself accompanying them.

No one was more alive than the Commander of the Delhi Field Force to the fact that no further aid could be expected, and no one realized more keenly than he did that the strength of the little army at his disposal was diminishing day by day.  But Wilson had never been sanguine as to the possibility of capturing Delhi without aid from the south.  In a letter to Baird-Smith dated the 20th August, he discussed at length his reasons for not being in a position to ’hold out any hope of being able to take the place until supported by the force from below.’  He now was aware that no troops could be expected from the south, and Sir John Lawrence plainly told him that he had sent him the last man he could spare from the Punjab.  On the 29th August Lawrence wrote to Wilson:  ’There seem to be very strong reasons for assaulting as soon as practicable.  Every day’s delay is fraught with danger.  Every day disaffection and mutiny spread.  Every day adds to the danger of the Native Princes taking part against us.’  But Wilson did not find it easy to make up his mind to assault.  He was ill.  Responsibility and anxiety had told upon him.  He had grown nervous and hesitating, and the longer it was delayed the more difficult the task appeared to him.

[Illustration:  SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE THE ENGAGEMENT AT NAJAFGARH IN AUGUST, 1857.]