Having absorbed the fundamental fact that the Allies proposed to continue the fight to the end, what then was Germany’s position?  I am not one of those who cherish the fatuous delusion that this is a war in which the German people are not equally involved with their government.  At the same time, it is undeniable that there existed in both the German and the Austrian empires a considerable internal pressure, induced by hunger and by privations (but not by any moral or ethical considerations), to bring the war to a close.  The cupboards of Russia were neither so full nor so readily available as had been anticipated.  Suffering was general, and, with the scarcity not only of food but of wool and of cotton, made the prospect of going through another winter of war a gloomy contemplation.  In Austria the situation was worse than in Germany.  The letter of the Austrian Emperor to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, which the French Government published in April, gives sufficient indication of the Austrian need for peace.  It shows also that Germany must have had doubt of the loyalty of her ally, and German knowledge that conditions had come to such a pass in Austria that a separate peace would be more welcome to Austria than no peace at all, regardless of the sacrifices which had to be made to obtain it.  How long Austria could be held Germany did not know, but it was evident that she was not to be trusted too far.  Austria is as unscrupulous, as hypocritical as is Germany, and Germany knows it.  And while there may be honor among thieves, there is also suspicion.

[Sidenote:  Germany must resume the offensive.]

But, aside from internal and political considerations, the military situation itself was one which demanded immediate action or none at all.  It is an elemental military fact that a war cannot be won by defensive action alone.  Defeat may be averted by such means; but victory cannot be achieved.  Germany, with the exception of a single incident south of Cambrai, had been on the defensive since the close of the battle of Verdun early in the summer of 1916.  The necessity for offensive action at some time was therefore absolute if Germany was to win.  But there were many considerations which made that time the present.  Germany could not afford to wait.

[Sidenote:  Divisions are brought from Russia.]

The middle of March found Germany at the height of her man power.  Never before since the outbreak of war had the opportunity been presented for the concentration on the western front of practically her entire effective strength in both men and guns.  For this, of course, Russia was responsible.  The divisions which were holding the Russian lines had been carefully picked over, and from men thus selected new divisions were formed and old ones filled up.  All were sent to France as rapidly as possible, the movement occupying the time from September, 1917, to March of this year.  Similarly, all available artillery was concentrated in the west, the eastern front being practically denuded.  Germany then was in immediate danger of being diverted by activities of the Allies in other fields.