[Sidenote:  Germany’s eastern ambitions attained.]

[Sidenote:  A peace by compromise would be a German victory.]

The developments in Russia, so entirely favorable to Germany, led many to believe that, having attained so completely their eastern ambitions, the German leaders would rest content with what they had, and, strengthening their lines in the west through reinforcements drawn from the Russian front, remain on the defensive on the western front until a peace could be arranged.  With the German talons firmly fixed in the throat of Ukraine; with Poland, Courland, and Lithuania practically annexed, there was a certain element of reason in this contention.  It was entirely conceivable that with such strength in the west, Germany could set in motion the machinery of a peace propaganda, and obtain a peace conference which would enable her to work out a programme of concessions in the west for concessions in the east—­a peace by compromise which would answer present needs while furnishing all future requirements in case she decided to provoke another war.  Thus Germany would end the war with a victory just as truly as if she had won it on the field of battle, and without the terrific loss in man power that an offensive on the western front would entail.

[Sidenote:  The Allies refuse a peace by compromise.]

In constructing this theory, however, certain essentials were ignored.  German voraciousness can never be satisfied.  It is a bottomless pit which can be filled only by pouring into it the world.  When there is nothing more to be had, Germany would perforce rest content.  The possession of Russia only whetted her appetite for France and Belgium and the life of England.  Moreover, the Allies, having now learned Germany, and having acquired a sense of their own safety and of the future peace of the world, had no thought of permitting Germany to remain in possession of western Russia, of Serbia, and of Rumania, and thereby not only perpetuating but actually aggravating the condition out of which grew the present war.  They had, therefore, notified Germany that they would lay down arms only when she was willing to disgorge what she and her allies had swallowed, and had rectified their frontiers in accordance with President Wilson’s fourteen conditions and with Lloyd George’s statement on the same subject.

In other words, Germany was to be permitted to emerge from the war with a profit only through military victory; she would have to defend her conquests.  This negatived the idea of a peace through negotiation.

[Sidenote:  The German people equally to blame with their government.]

[Sidenote:  The letter to Prince Sixtus.]

[Sidenote:  Austria might make a separate peace.]

[Sidenote:  There is suspicion among thieves.]