[Sidenote:  The British Empire asks peace and security.]

In the second place, the objects pursued by British policy on the African continent are inherently pacific and defensive.  It desires no man’s territory; it desires only to live in peace and develop the great African territories and populations intrusted to its care.  And looking at the future from the broadest points of view, looking at the magnitude of its material African interests and the future welfare of the vast native populations, and its difficult task of civilizing the dark continent; looking further upon Africa as the half-way house to India and Australasia, the British Empire asks only for peace and security—­international peace and security of its external communications.  It cannot allow the return of conditions which mean the militarization of the natives and their employment for schemes of world power; it cannot allow naval and submarine bases to be organized on both sides of the African coast, to the endangerment of the sea communications of the empire and the peace of the world.  And it must insist on the maintenance of conditions which will guarantee through land communications for its territories from one end of the continent to the other.

[Sidenote:  Dependence on communications by sea and land.]

The British Empire is not like Germany, Russia, or the United States, a compact territorial entity; it is scattered over the globe, and entirely dependent on the maintenance of communications for its continued existence.  In future these lines of communication should proceed not only by sea, but also by land.  One of the most impressive lessons of this vast war is the vulnerability of sea-power and sea communications through the development of underwater transport, and the immense importance of railway communication.  In fact, to be really effective the two should go hand in hand.  Nor are we at the end of the chapter in discovering new means of transportation.  It is not only conceivable, but probable, that aerial navigation may revolutionize the present transport situation.

[Sidenote:  Prussian militarism cannot be tolerated.]

[Sidenote:  The dominions desire a Monroe Doctrine for the South.]

As long as there is no real change of heart in Germany and no final and irrevocable break with militarism, the law of self-preservation should be considered paramount; no fresh extension of Prussian militarism to other continents and seas should be tolerated; and the conquered German colonies can be regarded only as guaranties for the security of the future peace of the world.  This opinion will be shared, I feel sure, by the vast bulk of the young nations who form the Dominions of the British Empire.  They have no military aims or ambitions; their tasks are solely the tasks of peace; their greatest interest and aim is peace.  Voluntarily they joined in this war, and to their efforts is largely due the destruction of the German Colonial Empire, and the