“The whole coast of West Africa from the mouth of the Cross River to the mouth of the Orange River would be in German possession.  When one only remembers what immense achievements were performed by the Emden in the Indian Ocean and by the Karlsruhe in the Atlantic, without any naval base, without any possibility of replenishing in port their supplies of munitions, food, etc., it will be realized what the fortification of half the West Coast of Africa would signify for Germany and for England!  As soon as, in the new war, the Suez Canal is closed against England by the Turks, all traffic between England and India, Australia, and South Africa must go round the Cape of Good Hope.  But then all the shipping must pass the coast of German Central Africa.  It would be impossible for England any longer to concentrate her whole fleet in the North Sea and to menace Germany.  She would be compelled to station a considerable fleet in South Africa for the protection of her trade, and that would mean a not inconsiderable weakening of her forces in European waters.”

In the same review Emil Zimmermann explains the role of German East Africa in the future scheme of world power: 

[Sidenote:  German Africa would have balance of power in the East.]

“German Africa, which will find allies at once in Abyssinia and in Mohammedan freedom movements, will make the employment of black troops against our European frontiers impossible.  German Africa alone will give us a balance of power in the East and in Africa.  It will remove the Egyptian pressure on Asia Minor.  German Africa will make us a world power by enabling us to exert decisive influence upon the world political decisions of our enemies and of other powers, and to exercise pressure on all shaping of policy in Africa, Asia Minor, and southern Europe.”

And in another article in the “Preussische Jahrbuecher,” he says:  “Nearer Asia cannot continue to exist without this covering of its flank.  That is the meaning of the German colonial question.”  In other words, Berlin-Bagdad is not safe without a great German Central or East African Empire.

[Sidenote:  British ambitions are different.]

[Sidenote:  German policies dangerous.]

The point of view of the British Empire is very different indeed.  In the first place, it has never had any military ambitions apart from the measure of sea-power essential to its continued existence; in Africa it has never militarized the natives, has always opposed any such policy and has tended to study the natives’ interests and regard their point of view with special favor, often to the no small disappointment of individual white settlers.  Indeed, no impartial person can deny that, so far from exploiting the natives either for military or industrial purposes, British policy has on the whole, over a very long stretch of years, had a tender regard for native interests, and on the whole its results have been beneficial to the natives in their gradual civilization.  In shaping this wise policy British statesmen have had a very long and wide African experience to guide them, and in consequence they have avoided the very dangerous and dubious policies which the German new-comers have set in motion.  Among these not the least dangerous is to regard the native primarily as raw material to be manufactured into military power and world power.