weapons.  In the artillery school, at Saumur, young officers were taught the fundamental principles of modern artillery; while at Issoudun an immense plant was built for training cadets in aviation.  These and other schools, with their well-considered curriculums for training in every branch of our organization, were coordinated in a manner best to develop an efficient army out of willing and industrious young men, many of whom had not before known even the rudiments of military technique.  Both Marshal Haig and General Petain placed officers and men at our disposal for instructional purposes, and we are deeply indebted for the opportunities given to profit by their veteran experience.

[Sidenote:  Questions of communication and supply.]

The eventual place the American Army should take on the western front was to a large extent influenced by the vital questions of communication and supply.  The northern ports of France were crowded by the British Armies’ shipping and supplies while the southern ports, though otherwise at our service, had not adequate port facilities for our purposes and these we should have to build.  The already overtaxed railway system behind the active front in northern France would not be available for us as lines of supply and those leading from the southern ports of northeastern France would be unequal to our needs without much new construction.  Practically all warehouses, supply depots and regulating stations must be provided by fresh constructions.  While France offered us such material as she had to spare after a drain of three years enormous quantities of material had to be brought across the Atlantic.

[Sidenote:  Plans for construction on a vast scale.]

With such a problem any temporization or lack of definiteness in making plans might cause failure even with victory within our grasp.  Moreover, broad plans commensurate with our national purpose and resources would bring conviction of our power to every soldier in the front line, to the nations associated with us in the war, and to the enemy.  The tonnage for material for necessary construction for the supply of an army of three and perhaps four million men would require a mammoth program of shipbuilding at home, and miles of dock construction in France, with a correspondingly large project for additional railways and for storage depots.

[Sidenote:  The southern ports are selected.]

All these considerations led to the inevitable conclusion that if we were to handle and supply the great forces deemed essential to win the war we must utilise the southern ports of France—­Bordeaux, La Pallice, St. Nazaire, and Brest—­and the comparatively unused railway systems leading therefrom to the northeast.  Generally speaking, then, this would contemplate the use of our forces against the enemy somewhere in that direction, but the great depots of supply must be centrally located, preferably in the area included by Tours, Bourges, and Chateauroux, so that our armies could be supplied with equal facility wherever they might be serving on the western front.