was reached.  The German position at this point in the attack became practically untenable.  The northern side of this wedge was lined with heights from which the British artillery was pouring a devastating plunging fire.  These heights, beginning farther east, began with the famous Messines-Wytschaete Ridge and extended due west through Kemmel to Cassel.  Moreover, in falling back the British pivoted on Messines, which left this strong bastion from which to strike out against the very heart of the salient.  Accordingly, to remove this danger the German leaders swung the attack north against the Messines Ridge.  After days of fighting in which Bailleul was taken and the foot of the Kemmel series of hills was reached, the Messines Ridge was taken in reverse and the British line was withdrawn until it passed over the ridge just north of Wytschaete.  Still pressing on the north, the Germans attacked the Kemmel position, but the British, now reinforced by the French, threw the attacks back as rapidly as they formed.  Failing here and at the centre in Nieppe Forest, still another attack was delivered, this time against the southern side of the wedge from Givenchy to St. Venant.  The first two days of this fighting was also disastrous to the Germans who were entirely unable to dent the British positions.  In brief, the Germans were then enclosed in a huge semicircle about fifteen miles in diameter.  All parts of the area enclosed were subject to artillery fire from three sides and the Germans were striking first on one side then on the other in frantic efforts to break the Allies’ grip—­and giving no indication of sufficient power to succeed.

[Sidenote:  Objectives of the Germans in the North.]

[Sidenote:  The British gradually retire about Ypres.]

The objects of the German effort in the north were several.  Primarily it was intended as a means of breaking the defenses of Arras and of Lens by cutting in behind the heights of Notre Dame de Lorette and Vimy Ridge.  Again it was intended to take Hazebrouck, Bethune, St. Pol, Aire, and St. Omer, through which the distribution of supplies and men landing at Calais is effected.  Finally it was intended to take from the British the high ground in Flanders, uncover Ypres, and open the way to the coast.  But for many reasons, now that the Allies had caught their breath for a moment, so to speak, the advantage appeared to have passed from German hands.  The element of surprise, so essential to success even in trench warfare, was no longer possible.  The gradual retirements of the British around Ypres were not costly nor did they “open a way” to the channel ports as the Germans hoped.  The Germans had fixed the points of attack—­and these were the only possible points:  southern Flanders and from the Avre to the Scarpe.  Germany had already used in the offense 130 divisions out of 204; and of these 50 had been in action twice—­while the British had been heavily engaged from the outset, the French have had but few divisions in action.  There was, therefore, apparently much greater reserve strength behind the Allies’ battle line than Germany could possibly muster.  And it is reserve strength which must ultimately decide the issue.