When, however, such offences are committed, as they will occasionally be even under the best system, the discipline of consequences may still be resorted to; and if there exists that bond of confidence and affection above described, this discipline will be efficient.  For what are the natural consequences, say, of a theft?  They are of two kinds—­direct and indirect.  The direct consequence, as dictated by pure equity, is that of making restitution.  A just ruler (and every parent should aim to be one) will demand that, when possible, a wrong act shall be undone by a right one; and in the case of theft this implies either the restoration of the thing stolen, or, if it is consumed, the giving of an equivalent:  which, in the case of a child, may be effected out of its pocket-money.  The indirect and more serious consequence is the grave displeasure of parents—­a consequence which inevitably follows among all peoples civilised enough to regard theft as a crime.  “But,” it will be said, “the manifestation of parental displeasure, either in words or blows, is the ordinary course in these cases:  the method leads here to nothing new.”  Very true.  Already we have admitted that, in some directions, this method is spontaneously pursued.  Already we have shown that there is a tendency for educational systems to gravitate towards the true system.  And here we may remark, as before, that the intensity of this natural reaction will, in the beneficent order of things, adjust itself to the requirements—­that this parental displeasure will vent itself in violent measures during comparatively barbarous times, when children are also comparatively barbarous; and will express itself less cruelly in those more advanced social states in which, by implication, the children are amenable to milder treatment.  But what it chiefly concerns us here to observe is, that the manifestation of strong parental displeasure, produced by one of these graver offences, will be potent for good, just in proportion to the warmth of the attachment existing between parent and child.  Just in proportion as the discipline of natural consequences has been consistently pursued in other cases, will it be efficient in this case.  Proof is within the experience of all, if they will look for it.

For does not every one know that when he has offended another, the amount of regret he feels (of course, leaving worldly considerations out of the question) varies with the degree of sympathy he has for that other?  Is he not conscious that when the person offended is an enemy, the having given him annoyance is apt to be a source rather of secret satisfaction than of sorrow?  Does he not remember that where umbrage has been taken by some total stranger, he has felt much less concern than he would have done had such umbrage been taken by one with whom he was intimate?  While, conversely, has not the anger of an admired and cherished friend been regarded by him as a serious misfortune, long and keenly regretted?