* * * * *

If there requires further evidence of the rude, undeveloped character of our education, we have it in the fact that the comparative worths of different kinds of knowledge have been as yet scarcely even discussed—­much less discussed in a methodic way with definite results.  Not only is it that no standard of relative values has yet been agreed upon; but the existence of any such standard has not been conceived in a clear manner.  And not only is it that the existence of such a standard has not been clearly conceived; but the need for it seems to have been scarcely even felt.  Men read books on this topic, and attend lectures on that; decide that their children shall be instructed in these branches of knowledge, and shall not be instructed in those; and all under the guidance of mere custom, or liking, or prejudice; without ever considering the enormous importance of determining in some rational way what things are really most worth learning.  It is true that in all circles we hear occasional remarks on the importance of this or the other order of information.  But whether the degree of its importance justifies the expenditure of the time needed to acquire it; and whether there are not things of more importance to which such time might be better devoted; are queries which, if raised at all, are disposed of quite summarily, according to personal predilections.  It is true also, that now and then, we hear revived the standing controversy respecting the comparative merits of classics and mathematics.  This controversy, however, is carried on in an empirical manner, with no reference to an ascertained criterion; and the question at issue is insignificant when compared with the general question of which it is part.  To suppose that deciding whether a mathematical or a classical education is the best is deciding what is the proper curriculum, is much the same thing as to suppose that the whole of dietetics lies in ascertaining whether or not bread is more nutritive than potatoes!

The question which we contend is of such transcendent moment, is, not whether such or such knowledge is of worth but what is its relative worth?  When they have named certain advantages which a given course of study has secured them, persons are apt to assume that they have justified themselves; quite forgetting that the adequateness of the advantages is the point to be judged.  There is, perhaps, not a subject to which men devote attention that has not some value.  A year diligently spent in getting up heraldry, would very possibly give a little further insight into ancient manners and morals.  Any one who should learn the distances between all the towns in England, might, in the course of his life, find one or two of the thousand facts he had acquired of some slight service when arranging a journey.  Gathering together all the small gossip of a county, profitless occupation as it would be, might yet occasionally