Mankind find themselves unable to conceive that there can be thought without things thought of.  Hegel, however, asserts that there can be thought without things thought of.  That ultimate test of a true proposition—­the inability of the human mind to conceive the negation of it—­which in all other cases he considers valid, he considers invalid where it suits his convenience to do so; and yet at the same time denies the right of an opponent to follow his example.  If it is competent for him to posit dogmas, which are the direct negations of what human consciousness recognises; then is it also competent for his antagonists to stop him at every step in his argument by saying, that though the particular inference he is drawing seems to his mind, and to all minds, necessarily to follow from the premises, yet it is not true, but the contrary inference is true.  Or, to state the dilemma in another form:—­If he sets out with inconceivable propositions, then may he with equal propriety make all his succeeding propositions inconceivable ones—­may at every step throughout his reasoning draw exactly the opposite conclusion to that which seems involved.

Hegel’s mode of procedure being thus essentially suicidal, the Hegelian classification which depends upon it falls to the ground.  Let us consider next that of M. Comte.

As all his readers must admit, M. Comte presents us with a scheme of the sciences which, unlike the foregoing ones, demands respectful consideration.  Widely as we differ from him, we cheerfully bear witness to the largeness of his views, the clearness of his reasoning, and the value of his speculations as contributing to intellectual progress.  Did we believe a serial arrangement of the sciences to be possible, that of M. Comte would certainly be the one we should adopt.  His fundamental propositions are thoroughly intelligible; and if not true, have a great semblance of truth.  His successive steps are logically co-ordinated; and he supports his conclusions by a considerable amount of evidence—­evidence which, so long as it is not critically examined, or not met by counter evidence, seems to substantiate his positions.  But it only needs to assume that antagonistic attitude which ought to be assumed towards new doctrines, in the belief that, if true, they will prosper by conquering objectors—­it needs but to test his leading doctrines either by other facts than those he cites, or by his own facts differently applied, to at once show that they will not stand.  We will proceed thus to deal with the general principle on which he bases his hierarchy of the sciences.