This information was misleading. I afterwards ascertained that without storming the Boer position there was no road open to Johannesburg except by a wide detour of many miles to the right.
[8.30 a.m.]
At this moment Dr. Jameson received a letter from the High Commissioner again ordering us to desist in our advance. Dr. Jameson informed me at the same time of the most disheartening news, viz., that he had received a message stating that Johannesburg would not or could not come to our assistance, and that we must fight our way through unaided.
Thinking that the first ridge now in our hands was Doornkop, we again pushed rapidly on, only to find that in rear of the ridge another steep and stony kopje, some 400 feet in height, was held by hundreds of Boers completely covered from our fire.
This kopje effectually flanked the road over which the column must advance at a distance of 400 yards. Scouting showed that there was no way of getting round this hill.
Surrounded on all sides by the Boers, men and horses wearied out, outnumbered by at least six to one, our friends having failed to keep their promises to meet us, and my force reduced numerically by one-fourth, I no longer considered that I was justified in sacrificing any more of the lives of the men under me.
[Wonderfully considerate! seeing how they deliberately risked the lives of thousands in Johannesburg when they started.]
As previously explained, our object in coming had been to render assistance, without bloodshed if possible, to the inhabitants of Johannesburg. This object would in no way be furthered by a hopeless attempt to cut our way through overwhelming numbers, an attempt, moreover which must without any doubt have entailed heavy and useless slaughter.
[9.15 a.m.]
With Dr. Jameson’s permission, I therefore sent word to the Commandant that we would surrender provided that he would give a guarantee of safe conduct out of the country to every member of the force.
To this Commandant Cronje replied by a guarantee of the lives of all, provided that we would lay down our arms and pay all expenses.
In spite of this guarantee of the lives of all, Commandant Malan subsequently repudiated the guarantee in so far as to say that he would not answer for the lives of the leaders, but this was not until our arms had been given up and the force at the mercy of the Boers.
I attribute our failure to reach Johannesburg in a great measure to loss of time from the following causes:
(1) The delay occasioned by the demonstration in front of Krugersdorp, which had been assigned as the place of junction with the Johannesburg force.
(2) The non-arrival of that force at Krugersdorp or of the guides to the Krugersdorp-Johannesburg section of the road, as previously promised by Johannesburg.
(3) The delay consequent on moving to the firing of the supposed Johannesburg column just before dark on Wednesday evening.