[Start from Pitsani.]

The force left Pitsani Camp at 6.30 p.m., December 29, and marched through the night.

At 5.15 a.m. on the morning of the 30th the column reached the village of Malmani (39 miles distant from Pitsani).

[Junction effected at Malmani with B.B.P.]

Precisely at the same moment the advanced guard of the Mafeking Column (under Colonel Grey) reached the village, and the junction was effected between the two bodies.

For details of the composition of the combined force, as also for general particulars of the march to Krugersdorp, see sketch of the route and schedule attached (marked A. and B. respectively).

[Defile at lead-mines passed.]

From Malmani I pushed on as rapidly as possible in order to cross in daylight the very dangerous defile at Lead Mines.  This place, distant 71 miles from Pitsani, was passed at 5.30 p.m., December 30.

I was subsequently informed that a force of several hundred Boers, sent from Lichtenburg to intercept the force at this point, missed doing so by three hours only.

[Letter from Commandant-General.]

At our next ‘off-saddle’ Dr. Jameson received a letter from the Commandant-General of the Transvaal demanding to know the reason of our advance, and ordering us to return immediately.  A reply was sent to this, explaining Dr. Jameson’s reasons in the same terms as those used to the force at Pitsani.

[Letter from High Commissioner.]

At Doornport (91 miles from Pitsani), during an ‘off-saddle’ early on Tuesday morning, December 31, a mounted messenger overtook us, and presented a letter from the High Commissioner, which contained an order to Dr. Jameson and myself to return at once to Mafeking and Pitsani.

[Reasons for not retreating.]

A retreat by now was out of the question, and to comply with these instructions an impossibility.  In the first place, there was absolutely no food for men or horses along the road which we had recently followed; secondly, three days at least would be necessary for our horses, jaded with forced marching, to return; on the road ahead we were sure of finding, at all events, some food for man and beast.  Furthermore, we had by now traversed almost two-thirds of the total distance; a large force of Boers was known to be intercepting our retreat, and we were convinced that any retrograde movement would bring on an attack of Boers from all sides.

It was felt, therefore, that to ensure the safety of our little force, no alternative remained but to push on to Krugersdorp to our friends, who we were confident would be awaiting our arrival there.

Apart from the above considerations, even had it been possible to effect a retreat from Doornport, we knew that Johannesburg had risen, and felt that by turning back we should be shamefully deserting those coming to meet us.

[They could not possibly know it, because the rising—­i.e. the public arming and moving of men—­only began at the very hour they claim to have known it, and because the first news from Johannesburg only reached them 24 hours later by the two cyclists ‘Oh what a tangled web we weave, when—­’]