The position in which the President found himself was undoubtedly one of some difficulty, but he chose a very bad way out of it.  High-handed arbitrary methods cannot effect a permanent and satisfactory solution of a question of that character, but Mr. Kruger was unwilling to go to the root of the evil and to admit what Mr. Kotze’s judgment had brought home with perhaps too sudden force, namely, that the laws and system of Government were in a condition of complete chaos.  The sequel can be told in a few words.  In February, 1898, Mr. Kotze considered that ample time had been allowed by him for the fulfilment of President Kruger’s promise.  Sir Henry de Villiers thought it proper to allow more time.  The point of difference between Mr. Kotze and Sir Henry de Villiers was the interpretation to be placed upon the expression ‘this session,’ which had been used in the previous February when the President had said that if he did not introduce the proposed measures this session, the judges might consider that he had failed to keep his promise.  Mr. Kotze contended that as the Raad was then in session it meant that Session, and that in any case that session and another had passed, and a third was in progress and there was still no sign of the promised measures.  Sir Henry de Villiers stated that in his opinion the reasonable construction would be that Mr. Kruger meant the following ordinary session, and that only ordinary sessions could be considered (for in each year there are one special and one ordinary session), so that the President might be entitled to claim the whole of the year 1898 within which to fulfil his promise, but that this would be the extreme limit of forbearance, after which failure could only be regarded as a breach of faith.  Sir Henry de Villiers in fact defended Mr. Kruger.  Mr. Kotze, however, held to his opinion; he wrote to the President reminding him of the undertaking, charged him with failure to keep his promise and withdrew the pledge which he had given.  The President promptly exercised his right under Law 1 of 1897, and dismissed Mr. Kotze, who had served the country as judge and chief justice for over twenty years.  Whatever the merits of the particular case may be it appeared to be a shocking exhibition of arbitrary power to dismiss without compensation, pension, or provision of any sort, a man no longer young, whose services had been given for nearly a quarter of a century, who in the extreme dilemma of the Raid had stood by the President, and who, from some points of view, must be admitted to have served him ‘not wisely but too well.’