Given the sympathy and the means, the difficulty of President Kruger’s self-imposed task was not so great as at first appeared.  To some it was advisable to do no more than point to the Jameson Raid and say:  ‘We only wish to live in peace and to be left alone.’  To some again that act is construed as a sign that the British people wish to upset the two Republics, therefore they must strengthen and be prepared.  To others the appeal is made:  ’We Dutch are the settlers and owners of the country, we wish for peace, of course, but we must dominate—­you under your form of government, we under ours.’  To others again it is further advanced:  ’Let us negotiate the elimination of the Imperial power; we do not suggest fight, but if we present a united front they must retire peacefully and concede our demands.’  And lastly comes the appeal to those who are in sympathy with the advanced republicans:  ’Arm and prepare.  Some day we shall find England in a difficulty, divided by party or hampered by external complications; it has often happened before and we have always profited.  That will be our time to drive them out.’

It would be very unjust to some of the most prominent men on the Dutch side in Cape Colony to leave the slenderest grounds for the inference that they are to be associated with the extreme and actively disloyal aim.  All that it is intended to do is to indicate the fine gradations in arguments by which a number are drawn together—­under a leadership which they do not realize, and going they know not where!  The strongest of these arguments and appeals are particularly popular with the younger generation of Dutch South Africans who entertain a visionary scheme of independence suggested by the history of the United States.  But there is something more serious in it than this, as may be deduced from the fact that in December, 1896, the writer was approached by Mr. D.P.  Graaff, formerly a prominent member of the Cape Legislative Council and now as always a prominent Afrikander Bondsman, with the suggestion that all the South African born should combine in the effort to create the United States of South Africa, ’upon friendly terms with England, but confining the direct Imperial right in South Africa to a naval base at Simonstown and possibly a position in Natal.’  This concession—­from South Africa to England—­would not, it was argued, involve disadvantage to the former, because for a considerable time it would be necessary to preserve friendly relations with England and to have the protection of her fleet for the coast.

It is of course quite easy to attach too much importance to the opinions of individual politicians of this class, who are as a rule merely shouters with the biggest crowd; but the prominent association of such an apostle of republicanism with the Bond, and the fact that he should have gone so far with a Reformer of known strong British sympathies seem to warrant the attaching of some importance to the suggestion.{43}