Dr. Coster would accept no further modification or variation of his terms—­there was no option to individuals to plead not guilty and fight it out, except at the cost of involving all the others, nor was there any option to them to plead with the leaders.  One other factor in the determination of this policy remains to be noted.  The communications already recorded as having passed between some of the members of the Reform Committee and Dr. Jameson, after the latter had actually invaded the country, and some evidence as to the arrangements made for the reception and camping of his force, were in the hands of the Government, and these were sufficient to convict every member of the Reform Committee under count 2 of the indictment in a trial before a Boer jury and by a special judge.  Conviction under count 1 was assured by the letter of invitation and the admissions in the ‘privileged’ meeting with the Government Commission.  Conviction under count 2 would be a distinct aggravation of the position of the four—­or so it seemed then—­whilst it would be a most serious thing for the rank and file; and it was finally decided to plead in accordance with the suggestion of the State Attorney.  The decision was conveyed to this gentleman and by him to the President, who expressed his ‘satisfaction’ at a course which would enable him to ‘deal magnanimously with the prisoners,’ no doubt in pursuance of the policy of ‘Forget and Forgive.’  When, as a convincing proof of the wisdom of the decision to plead guilty, the ‘satisfaction’ of the President was made known to the Irreconcilables, they remarked that this was the worst sign that they had yet detected, but others were more hopeful.

As to the soundness of the advice on which the prisoners pleaded, it may be observed that Messrs. Gregorowski and Coster have both since then expressed the opinion that there was sufficient evidence to convict one and all of high treason, and they should know what would have been considered ‘sufficient.’  The latter added that the prime movers were of course guilty; but they at any rate had tried to stop Jameson, whilst those who joined the Reform Committee in the later stages were morally worse, since they had only joined when and because they knew that he had invaded the country.  Mr. Gregorowski, at a later stage, defended his sentence on the leaders, but feared he had been ‘far too lenient with the others.’  It would be unfair therefore to suggest that the advice on which the prisoners had decided to act was other than sound wise and proper in the circumstances.  That it should afterwards appear that the other parties to the arrangement had acted with deliberate duplicity and bad faith cannot be laid as a charge against the gentlemen who gave this advice, and whose only fault, if fault it be, was that their instincts, their principles, and their training precluded the suspicion of treachery.