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They must not underrate their real and many difficulties.  He could point to the south-western border, the Zulu, the goldfields, and other questions, and show them that it was their duty to come to an arrangement with the British Government, and to do so in a bold and manly manner.  An hon. member on Saturday last had spoken with a fervent patriotism; but he had failed to appreciate the reference, because it amounted to this—­that they must shut their eyes to everything, so as to keep their independence.

President Burgers, who left the Transvaal broken-hearted, more by the cruel and mean intriguing and dissensions among, and disloyalty of, his own people, which made the annexation possible, than by the Act itself, when dying left a statement of the case.  It is too long to reproduce in its entirety.  He shows how the English faction worked for annexation, and how the Dopper party, headed by Kruger, allied themselves with the former in intrigue against the Government, thwarting all effort at reform and organization, and encouraging the refusal to pay taxes.  He states plainly that this course was pursued by Kruger in order to oust him from power, and secure the Presidency for himself.  He shows how he opposed ’that other element which had formerly worked in secret, viz., British interference, which got a strong support from the Boers themselves, and one of their chief leaders, P. Kruger, who had betrayed me, after promising me his and his party’s support.’  He gives the final scene as follows: 

The Volksraad had gone away, having done nothing but harm.  The members of the Executive had gone home, as if all were safe, and I sat with a half-new Cabinet and part of an old one, half discharged.  Yet I made one attempt more, and drafted a letter to Shepstone, intimating that I would oppose the annexation by force of arms, etc.; and showed this to two members of the Executive.  The response to my appeal, however, was so weak (one of them being in league with the English) that I had to abandon the project, and try to prepare for the worst.  When, therefore, Shepstone’s announcement came—­that he could wait no longer, that he had given us time enough to reform, and that he must issue his proclamation—­I could do no more than advise a protest, and an appeal to foreign powers.  This having been agreed to by my Government, I met Shepstone in presence of the Executive, and what could be saved for the country, such as its language, its legislature, the position of its officials, etc., was arranged.  Before issuing his proclamation, Shepstone desired to see copies of both mine and the Government protest.  This I promised, on condition he showed me his proclamation before publication:  to which he agreed.  To one clause I greatly objected, and protested—­namely, the threat of confiscation of property for disobeying the proclamation.  I pointed out that this was barbarous, and would be punishing a man’s innocent family for his actions.  The clause was omitted.  This is the origin of the lie that I helped Shepstone in drawing up this proclamation.  In justice to Shepstone, I must say that I would not consider an officer of my Government to have acted faithfully if he had not done what Shepstone did; and if the act was wrong (which undoubtedly it was), not he, but his Government, is to blame for it.